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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
NOTES
Bankruptcy-States May Not Suspend Driver's License of Bankrupt
Who Fails To Satisfy Accident Judgment Debt
Adolfo Perez was one of 22,000,000 Americans involved in a traffic
accident in 1965.' Like millions of. other drivers, he had no liability
insurance 2 and only limited assets. When judgment was entered against
him in an Arizona state court, Perez was unable to compensate his
injured victim. He sought relief by filing a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy. According to section seventeen of the Bankruptcy Act, the dis-
charge Perez received released him "from all of his provable debts."3
When Arizona nevertheless suspended his license and automobile regis-
tration because he had failed to pay the judgment debt, Perez protested
that the state had denied him the full benefit of his discharge. The
Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act required the suspen-
sion to continue until the judgment debt was satisfied.' Furthermore, the
Act specifically provided that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy following
the rendering of such judgment shall not relieve the judgment debtor
from any of the requirements of this article." 5
Overruling two earlier decisions,6 the Supreme Court in Perez v.
Campbell7 held that this provision of the Arizona statute conflicted with
section seventeen of the Bankruptcy Act, making it invalid under the
'NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1966).
2See note 53 & accompanying text infra.
'"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether
allowable in full or in part, except such as . . . [are specially enumerated in § 17a]." Bankruptcy
Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1970). A discharge in bankruptcy constitutes a complete and adequate
remedy at law in the nature of an affirmative defense to any legal proceedings brought on the debts
which were scheduled in the bankruptcy proceedings; a discharge is neither payment nor extinguish-
ment of debts, but is merely a bar to their enforcement by legal proceedings. Helms v. Holmes,
129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942). See generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 17.27 (4th ed. 1971).
Judgments arising from negligent automobile driving are generally dischargeable if provable
under § 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, I I U.S.C. § 103 (1970). They are not exempted from discharge
by the "willful and malicious injuries" phrase of § 17a(8), II U.S.C. § 35a(8) (1970). This
conclusion is based on the dictum in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 489 (1904): "One who
negligently drives through a crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs over an individual would
not . . . be within . . . [the 'willful and malicious' injury exception]." See also Lewis v. Roberts,
267 U.S. 467 (1925).
4ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1162A, -1 163A (1956).
51d. § 28-1163B.
6Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33
(1941).
7402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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supremacy clause of the Constitution. 8 The decision is a clear warning
that the Court will no longer tolerate legislative erosion of the safeguards
implicit in the bankruptcy discharge, but the major impact of the deci-
sion may be on the present automobile-accident compensation system,
already in a state of flux.
Financial responsibility statutes are widespread. All fifty states and
the District of Columbia have statutes similar in purpose and statutory
design to the Arizona Safety Responsibility Act.' In addition, two states
have grafted the requirement of compulsory liability insurance to the
basic plan, 0 and six others have recently combined compulsory insur-
ance and a partial "no fault" approach to liability." The basic financial
responsibility laws allow a motorist to drive without insurance until he
is involved in an accident causing personal injury or property damages
above a statutory minimum. After an accident he is required to post
security, in the form of cash or an insurance policy, sufficient to cover
the probable liability arising from the accident. If found liable for the
accident, the driver must also show proof of future financial responsibil-
ity, normally in the form of a certificate of insurance.'" Failure to meet
these requirements or to satisfy a judgment debt arising from the acci-
dent results in the suspension of driving privileges in every jurisdiction. 13
As the Supreme Court finally acknowledged in Perez, the financial
responsibility laws were designed primarily to compensate injured par-
ties;" their accident-deterrent function was largely a fiction. Unfortun-
ately, even before the Perez decision, the laws did not form an adequate
accident-compensation system. The plan leaves most motorists free not
to insure if they so choose. Only those who have an accident that is
8
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
'Comment, A Survey of Financial Responsibility Laws and Compenstion of Traffic Victims:
A Proposal for Reform, 21 VAND. L. REv. 1050, 1081-82 (1968).
"N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-21 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319
(1965), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
"Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a compulsory insurance law and has also had a
no fault law in effect since January 1, 1971. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-N (1970). Five other
states have recently enacted some form of no-fault legislation, which is generally to be effective in
January, 1972. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, § 1, at 81, col. 7.
12Comment, supa note 9, at 1052-54; see UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ch. 7 (1969 version). Most
states based their statute on this CODE.
"This provision is basic to every financial responsibility law; it is the ultimate sanction which
makes the statute work. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICIM 539 (Appendix C) (1965).
"402 U.S. at 644-48.
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reported to state authorities are required to insure. Reporting of acci-
dents is everywhere basically a matter of private initiative by the injured
party. When there are no assets or insurance to satisfy an eventual
judgment, or when some private settlement has been made at the time
of the accident, the incentive to report the accident is lacking, and even
the motorist who is clearly at fault is never forced to insure. 5 Worst of
all, the "first" accident victim has little protection. Since the negligent
driver can always elect to bow to the suspension sanction and leave the
highway rather than compensate the injured party, the financial respon-
sibility laws carry no guarantee that a judgment against him will ever
be satisfied."6
Until Perez the financial responsibility laws had withstood a wide
variety of constitutional attacks,' 7 although they had suffered a few
isolated defeats. 8 The overwhelming majority of courts have viewed such
statutes as a reasonable exercise of the police power and have thus held
that they do not violate the equal protection 9 or the due process"0
clauses, the right against self-incriminatibn,2' or the prohibition against
imprisonment for civil debt;22 nor are such laws an improper delegation
of judicial power z or special legislation.24
"Most states do have reporting statutes that require motorists involved in accidents causing
injury to any person or more than minimal property damage to report to the local police authorities.
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166.1 (1965); UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE §§ 10-106,-107 (1969 version).
Nevertheless, in rural and isolated urban areas compliance with the statute depends largely upon
the insistence of the injured party. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensa-
tion, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 300, 306-07 (1950).
6Although the financial responsibility laws may be of no assistance to the judgment creditor
in this situation, he may resort to any of the normal remedies for nonpayment of a judgment debt.
In most jurisdictions, a judgment creates a lien on the property of the judgment debtor; the victim
may therefore obtain a writ of execution and have the property seized and sold to satisfy the
judgment. Of course, this remedy is useful only insofar as the debtor has assets to be seized.
17See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954). The validity of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act was upheld in Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963).
IsMiller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1970); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d
180 (1961).
"Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Williams v.
Newton, 236 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
2'Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Escopedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.
2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Williams v. Newton, 236 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
21Surtman v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471, petition for cert. dismissed
per stipulation, 323 U.S. 806 (1944).
22Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930 (1940).
2Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d I (1950).
2'Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 PA81 (1931).
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The conflict which the Supreme Court finally recognized as intoler-
able in Perez was that between the Bankruptcy Act and the provisions
of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act that deny a
judgment debtor the full immunity given him by section seventeen of the
Bankruptcy Act. Twice in the past, in construing state provisions almost
identical to those in Perez, the Court resolved the conflict in favor of
the financial responsibility acts. Thirty years ago in Reitz v. Mealey, 2
the Court upheld New York's statute26 which provided for suspension
of the judgment debtor's driving privileges so long as the judgment was
not satisfied and also required satisfaction other than by a discharge in
bankruptcy. Without denying the bankrupt-appellant's contention that
one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to give the honest
debtor a tresh start,27 the Court deferred to the legitimate state interest
in highway safety and the protection of the public from the financially
irresponsible motorist.2 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts con-
ceded that the financial responsibility act conflicted to a certain extent
with the discharge provision 9 but reasoned that dilution of the impact
of the suspension sanction would emasculate the act:
The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless driver
were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expediency of
voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that
a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of
the statute °
Although Justice Roberts' cavalier characterization of bankruptcy as a
"simple expediency" is not necessarily accurate 3 1 the problems he for-
saw if this door were opened for the judgment debtor now confront those
states with financial responsibility plans.
"314 U.S. 33 (1941).
z'N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 330-68 (McKinney 1970). The Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act contains the same basic provisions. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § § 28-1161 to -1178
(1956), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
27E.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). The other major objective is an
equal distribution of the debtor's assets among his creditors. E.g., United States v. Embassy
Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959).
21314 U.S. at 36-37. The Court has long recognized the states' high degree of interest in
highway safety. E.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187
(1938).
1314 U.S. at 38.
-"ld. at 37.
"tSee text at notes 60-68 infra.
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More recently the Court in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety3
rejected another constitutional attack, this time against Utah's Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Two creditor-control provisions in
that Act were even more suspect than those approved in Reitz-the
power to initiate suspension by requesting the clerk of court to notify
the Motor Vehicle Commission of the unsatisfied judgment and the
power to revoke and restore the suspension in response to the debtor's
degree of cooperation. 33 Again the Court acknowledged the conflict but
sustained the state legislation:
Certainly some inroad is made on the consequences of bankruptcy if
the creditor can exert pressure to recoup a discharged debt, or part of
it. through the leverage of the State's licensing and registration power.
But the exercise of this power is deemed vital to the State's well-being
34
Overruling these two decisions, the majority in Perez v. Campbell
considered the conflict much more elemental. The Court was aided in
reaching this decision by a candid construction of the state law by the
Arizona Supreme Court, which had repeatedly said that the law's "prin-
cipal purpose" was "protection of the public. . . from financial hard-
ship" resulting from involvement in traffic accidents with uninsured
motorists unable to respond to a judgment. 35 The legislation therefore
had little relation to highway safety; the major emphasis was on provid-
ing leverage for the collection of damages, even after the judgment
debtor had been discharged in bankruptcy. 3 Thus characterized, the law
was clearly in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, which was promulgated
at least in part to give the bankrupt an opportunity to start afresh in
life, unhampered by existing debt.
32369 U.S. 153 (1962).
-Ch. 71, § 12, [1951] Utah Sess. L., codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-13 (1970). These
powers are effective even after a judgment debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, and state officials must
follow the creditor's directions. Id. By written request, the creditor places the clerk of court under
a duty to notify the Commission of the unsatisfied judgment; upon receiving the notice, the Com-
mission must suspend the registration and license of the debtor. UTAH COvE ANN. § 41-12-14(a).
With the creditor's consent, the suspension may be raised, but if the creditor subsequently with-
draws his consent, the Commission must reinstate the suspension. Id. § 41-12-14(b).
1369 U.S. at 171.
31Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 280, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963); accord, Camacho v.
Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558,456 P.2d 925, 928 (1969).
'The Colorado Supreme Court had made the same observation ten years ago. People v.
Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 215-216, 363 P.2d 180,. 183 (1961).
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Writing for the majority, Justice White relied upon Gibbons v.
Ogden37for his standard in weighing the two laws,primarily to stress that
the two earlier decisions on financial responsibility were "aberra-
tional' ' 38 and to counter in advance the stare decisis argument Justice
Blackmun raised in dissent:
39
As early as Gibbons v. Ogden . . (1824). Chief Justice Marshall
stated the governing principle-that "acts of the State Legislatures
. . . [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress
S. ." are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.40
The Kesler and Reitz decisions "ignored this controlling principle."' 4,
The Arizona law frustrated the desired operation of the Bankruptcy Act
by denying the bankrupt the full benefit of his discharge and is therefore
void.42 Justice White criticized the two earlier decisions for their myopic
reliance upon declarations of legislative purpose:
Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken in nearly
all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state
legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply
publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state inter-
est or policy-other than frustration of the federal objective-that
would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.4 3
Furthermore, concluded the majority, even if the supremacy clause anal-
ysis of Kesler and Reitz-looking to the ostensible purpose rather than
to the effect of state laws on federal legislation-is accepted, the Arizona
statute must be invalidated because the state's expressed legislative pur-
pose is the protection of "judgment creditors from 'financial hardship'
by giving them a powerful weapon with which to force bankrupts to pay
their debts despite their discharge.
'4
The majority in Perez clearly seems to have the stronger position.
There can be no doubt that most preexisting tort judgments are prova-
122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
3'402 U.S. at 651.
"'"I am not prepared to overrule [Reitz and Kesler] and to undermine their control over Adolfo
Perez' posture here." 402 U.S. at 664. See also id. at 667-68.
'0 Id. at 649, quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (emphasis by the
Gibbons Court).
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ble45 as fixed liabilities within the meaning of section sixty-three of the
Bankruptcy Act.4" Furthermore, such a judgment does not fall within
one of the classes of debts barred from discharge by section seventeen
of the Act if the driver was merely negligent and not "willful and mali-
cious" in his conduct.47 Since judgment debts are therefore dischargea-
ble, a state cannot create a device for their collection which survives a
discharge in bankruptcy. The federal bankruptcy power is "unrestricted
and paramount;" the states "may not pass or enforce laws to interfere
with . . .the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary
regulations."4 Under the Arizona statute, the creditor whose judgment
claim has been discharged had a powerful ally in the State Highway
Department, which would suspend the bankrupt's license until the judg-
ment was paid. The state had given the creditor a remedy which survived
bankruptcy and had therefore interferred with the Bankruptcy Act to an
intolerable degree. As Justice Douglas, the Court's bankruptcy expert, 4
observed in dissent to the Reitz decision thirty years ago, "[i]n practical
effect the bankrupt may be in as bad, or even worse, a position than if
the state had made it possible for a creditor to attach his future wages.
Such a device would clearly contravene the Bankruptcy Act.""0
The significance of the Perez ruling might easily be overlooked
because the Supreme Court invalidated only one small sub-section of the
Arizona Act, not the entire financial responsibility statute. In the
writer's opinion, however, that sub-section was the keystone of a com-
plex accident compensation scheme.5' By removing it the Supreme Court
may have added new impetus to what is developing as the most powerful
movement for reform of the automobile insurance laws in forty
years.52  Largely as a result of the free choice and the slippage in acci-
4Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925).
41Bankruptcy Act § 63, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
7Id. § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1970); see note 3 supra.
"8 lnternational Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
41"Justice Douglas doubtless brought to the Supreme Court a greater knowledge of the law
and practice of bankruptcy than any justice who had preceeded or any who has followed him."
Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Ruv. 773-74
(1969).
-°314 U.S. at 41-42.
"See Justice Roberts' reference to the importance of an undiluted suspension sanction in text
preceding note 30 supra.
52Widespread criticism of early state insurance laws resulted in adoption of the original finan-
cial responsibility laws almost forty years ago. The first of the financial responsibility statutes was
enacted in Connecticut in 1925. Ch. 183, [1925] Conn. Pub. Acts 3956 (now codified at CONN. GEN.
[Vol. 50
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dent reporting under the financial responsibility laws, approximately
fifteen percent of all drivers in the United States have no liability insur-
ance.53 This figure represents seventeen million drivers. 54 A motorist with
even moderate assets will normally buy insurance to cover a possible
adverse liability judgment, whereas the uninsured usually lack sufficient
assets to satisfy even an atypically small adverse liability judgment.55
They are effectively "judgment proof" in the language of the tort law-
yer. As a noted torts authority has said, they are also our worst drivers:
It is also undoubtedly true that uninsured drivers on the highway are
those who tend on the whole to be driving unsafe vehicles, to be the
most slipshod, law-violating and reckless, and to cause a dispropor-
tionately large percentage of the accients.5 6
When liability fell on an uninsured driver, the plight of the traffic
victim in a financial responsibility state was bleak enough before Perez.
7
In such a case the only leverage an injured person had was the threat of
permanent suspension of the judgment debtor's license and registration
if the judgment was not at least partially satisfied. Perez effectively
undercuts that sanction. As noted above, the uninsured are normally
judgment proof and without assets. Faced with a judgment debt which
could easily be 25,000 dollars, the debtor now has two choices. If he
cannot satisfy the judgment but is nevertheless reluctant to be adjudged
a bankrupt, he will lose his driving privilege permanently or at least until
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-112 to -133 (1970)). The scheme swept through at least thirty states in one wave
between 1925 and 1935. Aberg, Effects of and Problems Arising from Financial Responsibility
Laws, 1943 INS. L.J. 72.
ONAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 6, 1968, at 13. But the Department of Transportation estimated
that twenty percent of the vehicles in the United States were uninsured as of 1967. W. YOUNG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 69 (1971). The great variation between states
is seen in the estimate of thirty-five percent uninsured in Texas, Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959,
38 TEx. L. REV. 154 n.5 (1959), and only one percent uninsured in Massachusetts, Note,
Compensation Problems Created by Financially Irresponsible Motorists, 66 IARV. L. REV. 1300,
1307 (1953).
"In 1970 there were 11,000,000 licensed drivers in the United States. NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1971).
OGrad, supra note 15, at 311.
"v. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 85, at 578-79 (3d ed. 1964).
7"When there is no insurance, therefore, the present system falls far short of affording com-
pensation even in those cases where there is a theoretical legal right to it." James & Law,
Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little & Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70,
78-79 (1952).
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the debt is paid." If he is willing and financially able to file a bankruptcy
petition, however, he will recover his license and registration when the
discharge is granted. The seventeen million drivers who, like Adolfo
Perez, are uninsured and without assets have been given the opportunity
for one "free" accident every six years. 9
This is not to say that the escape from liability offered by the
"simple expediency of voluntary bankruptcy"60 is without expense or
limitations. Not only is discharge available to a debtor only once every
six years,6' but, contrary to popular belief, a bankruptcy proceeding is
priced beyond the reach of the totally indigent.12 The debtor must pay a
filing fee of fifty dollars before receiving his discharge, 3 and attorney's
fees for an uncomplicated voluntary bankruptcy range from 250 to 350
dollars." For these reasons, bankruptcy experts advise that bankruptcy
should not be considered unless the debtor owes at least one thousand
dollars of "disposable debts."65 During the bankruptcy proceedings, the
debtor must surrender to the trustee in bankruptcy all of his property
SUnder most financial responsibility laws, the judgment debtor need satisfy the liability judg-
ment against him only up to a stautory limit to avoid suspension of his license; the normal limit is
$20,000 for two or more personal injuries and $5,000 property damage. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT,
§ 28-1164 (Supp. 1970); UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 7-316 (1969 version).
59A discharge is available to a debtor only once every six years. Bankruptcy Act § I Ic(5), I I
U.S.C. § 32c(5) (1970).
6Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 37 (1941). See text preceding note 30 supra.
"Bankruptcy Act § 1 c(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32c(5) (1970).
'2There is at least a discernable trend in the lower federal courts toward a sharp reduction in
costs for the "poor" bankrupt. In the first ruling on the question of access by indigents to bank-
ruptcy proceedings since the landmark decision of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), it
was held that bankruptcy, like divorce in Boddie, is a "fundamental" right which cannot be denied
an indigent. As applied to indigent bankruptcy petitioners, the statutory requirement of prepayment
of a filing fee to obtain a discharge violates the fifth amendment right to due process, including
equal protection. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Without benefit of the Boddie
decision, two other federal courts recently split on the same constitutional question. In re Garland,
428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971) (filing-fee requirement not denial
of due process); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971) (filing-fee requirement is denial of
equal protection).
63Bankruptcy Act §§ 40c(l), 48c, 52a, I U.S.C. §§ 68c(l), 76c, 80a (1970).
"D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 59 (1963). This is not an assignment which
legal aid lawyers will normally perform for a welfare client. But see note 62 supra. If this new line
of cases is upheld, poverty lawyers may be expected to undertake bankruptcies as they are beginning
to handle divorces for indigent clients.
""Disposable debts" are defined as "those the debtor need not pay after bankruptcy either
as a matter of law or of practical necessity. . . . [T]his means [the debtor] should enjoy a net gain
of at least $1000 in his economic condition by elimination of indebtedness." D. CowANs, supra
note 64.
BANKR UPTCY-DRIVERS' LICENSES
except that which is exempted under state statute or under section sev-
enty of the Bankruptcy Act; the proceeds from the liquidation of the
bankrupt's estate are distributed among his creditors."6 It is this writer's
contention that the typical uninsured motorist will not have sufficient
assets over and above those that are exempt to make this collection and
distribution a threat to the debtor's status or a significant benefit to his
creditors, including the injured victim.6 7 Finally in most jurisdictions the
negligent driver will have to carry liability insurance to protect the mo-
toring public in the future, but only for one to three years after the
accident.6 8
Hopefully, the states that had relied on a financial responsibility
law to protect the driving public from the financially irresponsible mo-
torist will realize that the Perez decision has undercut the only sanction
in an already imperfect law and will therefore be more open to sugges-
tions for major reform in their insurance law. If new legislation is not
enacted, thousands of Americans will be killed and maimed on the high-
ways each year without adequate compensation for their injuries. Even
if they are involved in accidents only in proportion to their numbers on
the roads, uninsured motorists will be involved in some 2,400,000 acci-
dents resulting in 8,100 deaths and 26,250 permanent disabilities this
year and every year in the foreseeable future.69
The decision in Perez v. Campbell was a sound one from the point
of view of bankruptcy law; it protects the discharged debtor from what
had become a flagrant erosion of the protection promised him under the
Bankruptcy Act. Concomitantly, however, the decision left the individ-
ual injured by an uninsured motorist with much less protection and hope
for compensation than before. By opening wide the door through which
6OBankruptcy Act §§ 47a, 60, 67, 70, 11 U.S.C. §§ 75a, 96, 107, 110 (1970). See cases cited
note 27 supra.
"Eighty-eight percent of all consumer bankruptcy cases are "no assets" or "nominal assets"
situations. Countryman, Chapter XIII Wage Earners' Plans: Past, Present and Future, 18
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 275 (1969).
"Most financial responsibility laws allow the negligent driver to operate a motor vehicle
without proof of financial responsibility three years after the date such proof was first required of
him if he has not had another accident during that period. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28-1178 (1956);
UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 7-335 (1969 version).
"There were 54,800 motor vehicle deaths in 1970 and 2,000,000 disabling injuries; 175,000
persons suffered permanent impairments. Total economic loss from the 16,000,000 auto accidents
was S 13,600,000,000. There have been more than 52,000 deaths per year for the past five years.
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FAcTs 3,5,15,40 (1971).
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financially irresponsible motorists may escape liability for their negli-
gence, the Supreme Court may have unwittingly added new momentum
to the drive for wholesale reform of our automobile accident compensa-
tion system.
THOMAS A. LEMLY
Constitutional Law-Bar Admissions-New Standards for Inquiry into
Applicants' Associations and Beliefst
Bar associations have long conducted inquiries into the associations
and beliefs of applicants and excluded those "subversives" likely to be
a threat to the judicial system. I Since the first amendment applies to the
states 2 and protects the rights of belief and association, constitutional
problems arise when the state attempts to probe into this area. In Febru-
ary 1971 the United States Supreme Court decided three cases dealing
with the power of state bar associations to compel answers to questions
about the political associations of bar applicants. In Baird v. State Bar3
and In re Stolar4 questions posed by the Arizona 5 and Ohio6 bars were
held to be overly broad because they touched upon innocent as well as
tThe potential effects of the primary cases used here were analyzed while appeals to the
Supreme Court were pending in Note, Attorneys-Admission to the Bar-Consideration of the
Constitutionality of Bar Examiners' Inquiries into Political Associations and Beliefs, 48 N.C.L.
REv. 932 (1970). Having come before the highest court, they now deserve further consideration.
'Remarks of Hon. Samuel J. Kanner, Chairman of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, in
54 THE BRIEF 153, 154-55 (1959).
2E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
3401 U.S. 1 (1971).
'401 U.S. 23 (1971).
'Question 25 of the Arizona examination asks: "List all organizations, associations and club
[sic] (other than bar associations) of which you are or have been a member since attaining the age
of sixteen years." Question 27 asks: "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the
Communist Party or any organization that advocates the overthrow of the United States by force
or violence?" ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN., S. CT. RuiE 28(c), Exhibit A (Supp. 1970-71). Mrs. Baird
answered Question 25 satisfactorily but refused to answer Question 27. 401 U.S. at 4-5.
'Stolar declined to answer the following questions:
12. State whether you have been or presently are. . .(g) a member of any organization
which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force ....
13. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of which you
are or have been a member. 7. List the names and address of all clubs, societies or
organizations of which you are or have become a member since registering as a law
student.
401 U.S. at 27.
BAR ADMISSIONS
illegal membership in organizations. However, in a companion case,
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond 7 the
Court upheld questions 26.(a) and 26.(b) from the New York examina-
tion' because they focused on organizational membership which was
tantamount to criminal activity and therefore was a legitimate interest
of the state. Although the Court recognized the danger of such probes
it refused to forbid all questions dealing with political views and associa-
tions. The purpose of this note is to analyze the three cases, compare
them with the previous law, and evaluate the significance of the holdings.
A comparison of the powers of public employers and bar associa-
tions to inquire into the organizational membership of employees and
7401 U.S. 154 (1971). A three-judge United States District Court granted partial relief by
eliminating or revising certain questions objected to in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'The questions from the New York examination which are discussed in this note are:
26. (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any
organization or group of persons which, during the period of your membership or
association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United
States or any state or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or over-
turned by force, violence or any unlawful means? If your answer is in the affirmative,
state the facts below.
401 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
26.(b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such
membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organiza-
tion or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States
or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence or any unlawful means?
Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
LSCRRC also involved other issues which are outside the scope of this note. Petitioners
challenged New York's requirement that applicants possess "the character and general fitness
requisite for an attorney and counselor at law." The requirement was affirmed because New York
construed it "as encompassing no more than 'dishonorable conduct relevant to the legal profes-
sion.'" 401 U.S. at 159, quoting Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,
299 F. Supp. at 144 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Petitioners also urged that the requirement of third party affidavits attesting to good moral
character violated the right to privacy. The Court rejected this as bordering on the frivolous. 401
U.S. at 160.
In addition petitioners attacked the oath of "belief in the form of and loyalty to the Govern-
ment of the United States." 401 U.S. at 161. Although the Court recognized that on its face this
oath might be construed to violate the permissible scope of inquiry, it upheld the oath since as
construed by New York it merely required the applicant to swear that he will support the constitu-
tions of the United States and the state of New York. Id. See also Connell v. Higginbotham, 403
U.S. 207 (1971).
Finally, petitioners challenged two questions which asked whether the applicant could take the
oath of support for the Constitution without mental reservation. The Court ruled that there could
be little doubt of their validity since they were simply supportive of the applicant's good faith while
taking the oath; in other words the oath is not pro forma. 401 U.S. at 165-66.
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applicants reveals close parallels. Public employers have for two decades
been prohibited from excluding from employment those employees who
had no knowledge of the illegal goals of organizations to which they
belonged A requirement that teachers list all organizations to which
they had belonged in the previous five years has been overturned as
having a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of association by
discouraging group membership.' 0 The present standards of constitu-
tional inquiry by public employers are set forth in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents1 and Elfbrandt v. Russell:2 any imposition of civil disabili-
ties on employees for membership in the Communist Party, even mem-
bership with a knowledge of the Party's goals, are now invalid without
a showing that the employee had the specific intent to further the illegal
goals of the party.'
3
Most of these standards had previously been extended to the bar
applicant in a process of gradual evolution. In 1945 the Supreme Court
upheld the refusal of a state bar to admit a conscientious objector be-
cause he could not truthfully take the oath of support for the state
constitution which required male citizens to serve in the militia in the
event of peril to the state. 4 Twelve years later the Court, in Konigsberg
v. State Bar (Konigsberg I) 5, held that without a showing that the
applicant had engaged in or supported unlawful activities he could not
be excluded from the bar, even though he may have been a member of
the Communist Party. A companion case further held that arrests with-
out convictions are not sufficient evidence of bad character to justify
denial of admission to the bar. However, in 1961 a second Konigsberg
v. State Bar (Konigsberg II)11 allowed the bar to exclude the applicant
for refusing to answer a question, although the answer to the question
could not be in itself a ground for exclusion. The Court felt that the
state's interest in ensuring that its lawyers are dedicated to the law and
'Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In question 26. (a) of the New York examination
this requirement of scienter is met.
10Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
11385 U.S. 589 (1967).
12384 U.S. 11 (1966).
13385 U.S. at 609-10; 384 U.S. at 19.
"In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
15353 U.S. 252 (1957).
"Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 243-46 (1957).
17366 U.S. 36 (1961). The examiners gave Konigsberg a hearing and advised him that refusal
to answer would lead to exclusion.
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orderly change outweighed the constitutional infringement occasioned
by disclosure of past organizational membership, even though the ques-
tion did not focus on knowing membership with specific intent. Thus,
Konigsberg was said to be merely obstructing the examination process
rather than exercising his first amendment rights. On another front, a
California court had held that a criminal conviction is not a ground for
summary exclusion; the conviction which leads to exclusion must be
relevant to the practice of law."8
The recent cases afforded the Court an opportunity to equalize the
standards for public employees and bar applicants. The petitioner in
Baird answered a question which required her to list all organizations
to which she had belonged but refused to answer a second question which
required her to state whether she had been a member of the Communist
Party or any other organization the goals of which were the violent
overthrow of the government. 9 Justice Black's plurality opinion20 em-
phasized that since there was no requirement of scienter the second
question forced her to guess at the goals of the organizations to which
she had belonged. 21 When an individual's first amendment rights are
threatened, the state must carry a heavy burden of proof in establishing
the necessity of its actions.3
The assertion that the state has an interest in the character and
competence of its lawyers was inadequate since Mrs. Baird had given
sufficient response to other questions to satisfy the state's need.s Fur-
thermore, the question she refused to answer was an inquiry into mere
beliefs, which are constitutionally immune to inquisitions designed to
exclude one from the bar. 24
Stolar dealt with the rejection of a member of the New York Bar
'"Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1966). The court also said that a belief that a lawyer has a duty to disobey some unconstitutional
laws is not an inference of bad character.
"See note 5 supra.
"Baird and Stolar were both 5-4 decisions with the fifth vote in each case provided by Justice
Stewart's separate concurrence. Therefore there was not a majority Court's opinion in either case.
21401 U.S. at 5.
"Id. at 6-7.
2ld. at 7. Mrs. Baird listed former employers and law professors and also the following
organizations to which she had belonged: church choir, Girl Scouts, Girls Athletic Association,
Young Republicans, Young Democrats, Stanford Law Association, and Law School Civil Rights
Research Council. Id. at 7 n.7.
2 1d. at 8. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
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who had applied to the Ohio Bar. Stolar made available to the examiners
extensive background information 2 and orally stated that he had never
been a member of the Communist Party or the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society. He then refused to list all the organizations to which he
had belonged and to state whether he had been a member of an organiza-
tion which had plotted the overthrow of the government. The Court held
that the applicant cannot be excluded for beliefs alone, even if he person-
ally entertains beliefs the effectuation of which would be criminally
punishable conduct .2 The required listing of organizations may lead to
an intimidating further investigation and have a chilling effect on the
potential applicant's activities, thus infringing on the freedom of asso-
ciation.2Y As in Baird, Justice Black felt that Stolar had given ample
information for the bar to determine his fitness and therefore was not
required to answer a question which delved into a protected area. 21
Justice Stewart's concurring opinions in Baird and Stolar are par-
ticularly significant since his was the deciding vote in each case.20 Al-
though Justice Black's opinions stressed the concept that when the appli-
cant has furnished sufficient background information the bar has no
need or right to inquire into his political beliefs, Justice Stewart's votes
were cast because the questions might have led to exclusion for member-
ship without knowledge of the group's illegal goals and without the
specific intent to further them.30
In LSCRRC Justice Stewart wrote for a majority composed of
himself and the four dissenters in Baird and Stolar.31 LSCRR C involved
a group of law students who had not applied for bar admission but
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against two questions on the
25401 U.S. at 29. Stolar made available to the Ohio Bar the following information which had
been furnished to the New York Bar: his law school; every address at which he ever lived; names,
addresses, and occupations of his parents; his elementary and high schools; names of nine former
employers; his criminal record (two speeding tickets); nine character references; and extensive




"'Justice Stewart's opinions are, in effect, the law. The "lowest common denominator" concept
calculates the law as the common ground shared by the plurality opinion and any concurring
opinions that are necessary to give a majority.
11401 U.S. at 9-10; 401 U.S. at 31.
3'Justice Stewart's views in Baird and Stolar are expanded in LSCRRC. Justices Harlan,
White, and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger dissented in Baird and Stolar relying primarily on
Konigsberg I. 366 U.S. 36 (1961) and the idea that the bar should be protected from those who
would use the bar to upset the judicial system and society. 401 U.S. at 11; 401 U.S. at 31.
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New York examination which inquired into the organizational member-
ship of applicants.12 The first question required the applicant to affirm
or deny his participation in any group which he knew advocated the
overthrow of the government by force, violence, or any other means. The
second question, only to be answered if the first question drew an affirm-
ative response, inquired into the individual's specific intent to pursue the
admitted goals. Stewart's views were essentially unchanged from Baird
and Stolar, but here he detected an adherence to constitutionally accept-
able guidelines not present in those two cases." Since the state has the
right to protect itself from the very real danger of subversive attorneys,
it may ask questions of applicants which specifically identify those who
pose the danger. Questions which are preliminary to further investiga-
tion are permissible as long as exclusion would result only when the
investigation revealed that the applicant had actively engaged in subver-
sive activity.m There is no requirement that each question reflect these
standards, but rather the examination process as a whole must operate
within these limits. Since the inquiry stops for those who answer the first
question in the negative, there will be no unwarranted further interroga-
tion; therefore there will be no needless intimidation leading to a chilling
effect on the activities of law students.35 In a nutshell, the state may
exclude for knowledgeable membership and specific intent to further
illegal goals because this protects a legitimate state interest without
unnecessarily infringing on the applicant's first amendment rights.
Although the plurality's view in Baird and Stolar that if the appli-
cant has furnished sufficient information no further inquiry is allowable
is not treated in LSCRRC, one must conclude that it is not the control-
ling guideline when the three cases are viewed together. Justice Stewart
does not raise this issue in either of his concurring opinions, dwelling
instead on knowing membership and specific intent. Since his position
is the obvious polestar for lower courts, the sufficient-information stan-
dard will probably not play a prominent role in future decision-making.
The petitioner in Konigsberg 1136 had also furnished other background
information while steadfastly refusing to answer the questions posed by
the committee. The Konigsberg II holding on this point has been af-
"See note 8 supra.
"401 U.S. at 165-66.
uld.
3Id. at 154-59, 166 n.19.
-366 U.S. 36 (1961). See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
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firmed; the examining committee, not the applicant, will determine the
direction of the inquiry, subject to constitutional guidelines.
Baird, Stolar, and LSCRRC have, however, limited the Konigsberg
II standards of constitutionally permissible inquiry by bar examiners.
The Elfbrandt and Keyishian standards of scienter coupled with specific
intent have been applied to inquiries by the bar, extending the same
rights to bar applicants that have been enjoyed by public employees.3"
Not only must these requirements be met before the applicant may be
excluded, but also, in contrast to Konigsberg II, the applicant may
refuse to answer without being barred for obstructing the examining
process if the standards are not met.3 Furthermore, since membership
in an organization with knowledge of its illegal goals and with the spe-
cific intent to further those goals is criminally punishable, 31 the new
standards will exclude applicants only when their associations are tanta-
mount to criminal conduct.
The various objections to political inquiry need to be carefully ana-
lyzed. One objection raised against all inquiry into organizational mem-
bership was that a chilling effect inevitably results from such inquiry.4
That is, since law students realize that they may be held accountable for
their associations, they will be inclined to avoid any potentially damag-
ing associations. This objection is not easily thrust aside. When an appli-
cant gives a positive answer to New York's question 26.(a) and a nega-
tive answer to question 26.(b) he has exposed himself to further investi-
gation when, in fact, there may be no constitutional grounds for exclu-
sion. This particular instance may discourage group membership by law
students without serving the state's interest since the state has no legiti-
mate interest in the protected activities of applicants. This slight danger
is outweighed by the recognized interest of the state in determining the
qualifications of its lawyers." Furthermore, the new standards make it
clear to law students that they cannot be excluded for associations which
are not criminal in nature, and they can plan their activities accordingly.
Finally, membership which is reflected by a positive answer to both
26.(a) and 26.(b) is criminal conduct under Scales v. United States" and
deserves no protection from any chilling effect.
3See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
'sSee 401 U.S. at 7; 401 U.S. at 30-31.
"'Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1961).
11401 U.S. at 167.
"Id. at 165-66.
42367 U.S. 203 (1961); see text accompanying note 39 supra.
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It has also been argued that inquiry into group membership aids in
the perpetuation of a homogeneous bar by excluding "subversives" at
a time when there is a great need for lawyers who are sympathetic to
minority views. 3 The most obvious reply to this objection is simply to
ask if the modern bar appears to be homogeneous. The answer has to
be "no." With the narrower ground for exclusion indicated by Baird,
Stolar, and LSCRRC, an even less homogeneous bar may be anticipated
in the future. Mere political beliefs are protected-it is the participation
in an illegal activity which may result in denial of admission.44
Another argument relied on in LSCRRC is that when suitable
alternative methods are available there is no legitimate state interest
served by inquiry into organizational membership and therefore the first
amendment rights of applicants must tip the scales of justice.4 5 Alterna-
tives such as the criminal process, contempt powers, and disbarment are
sufficient to deal with the conduct of lawyers. Justice Stewart admitted
in LSCRRC that while this may be "wise" New York had made its
decision to conduct another program which is also within permissible
limits.46 It is quite possible that the declaratory nature of the case
aroused little sympathy with the Court since petitioners could not show
that anyone had ever been unconstitutionally excluded under the pro-
gram.47 Furthermore, would the alternative methods urged in LSCRRC
be sufficient to protect the bar? Certainly recent history shows that the
alternatives are less than foolproof.48 It may be very unwise to force bar
associations to rely as best they can on post-admission sanctions. Justice
Black argued in dissent in LSCRRC that excluding a man from his
career is as much of a punishment as depriving him of his property and
therefore should require the same level of culpability. He felt that since
3Comment, Bar Admissions-The Character Investigation as an Unconstitutional Scheme to
Promote Conformity: Comment on LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 23 VAND. L. REv. 131 (1969). Justice
Black raises this issue in dissent in LSCRRC. 401 U.S. at 181.
"Positive answers to the New York questions will not inevitably lead to exclusion but rather
to further investigation where the applicant has a chance to explain the' circumstances of his
membership. 401 U.S. at 165-66.
4401 U.S. at 167.
"I1d.
4"1d. at 165.
4 For an evaluation of the present practices and recommendations for the future, see American
College of Trial Lawyers Report and Recommendations on Disruption of the Judicial Process, 16
CATHOLIC LAW. 242, 249-53 (1970).
11401 U.S. at 174.
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under Brandenburg v. Ohio5 an individual can be punished only when
his speech raises an imminent danger of incitement to lawless conduct,
the same standard ought to be met before an individual is excluded from
the practice of law.5 Brandenburg is distinguishable, however, because
it involved a more pure form of speech while the sanctions under
LSCRRC are directed at specifically illegal activity. The bar associa-
tions only attempt to regulate the profession, not to impose punishment.
Denial of admission to the bar for subversive activities is no more a
penal sanction than denial of admission to a convicted felon would be
double jeopardy.
Other writers have pointed out that not all jurisdictions inquire into
the activities of bar applicants.52 In England an applicant must have
certificates of good moral character from two United Kingdom residents
who have known him for one year.5 He is ineligible for admission if he
is an undischarged bankrupt or has been convicted of an offense that the
examiners deem relevant to the profession. Canada's Ontario Province
abolished character investigations after finding no relationship between
prior conduct and conduct subsequent to admission." Apparently not
even all United States jurisdictions inquire into the loyalty of bar appli-
cants beyond the oath of support for the Constitution." Perhaps these
are enlightened jurisdictions, but as Justice Stewart noted, while other
programs may possess desirable features, the state has the right to con-
duct its own program within established guidelines. 5
Baird, Stolar, and LSCRRC represent a step forward by the Court
because they assure applicants that only activity which could result in
criminal punishment is a ground for denial of admission to the bar.
50395 U.S. 444 (1969).
5401 U.S. at 183-84.
'PComment, 23 VAND. L. REV., supra note 43, at 145-46.
Old. at 146 n.97.
uRemarks by Richard J. Roberts at the Joint Session of the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar and National Conference of Bar Examiners in The Canadian Approach to
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 36 B. EXAMINER 6, 34 (1967).
"Brown & Fasset, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 (1953).
See also 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 7(b), 12 (1937). It has not always been thought that
character examination was necessary. Under chapter five of the NORTH CAROLINA REVISAL OF 1905
an applicant who demonstrated his competence in the law was entitled to be licensed. Ch. 963, § 3,
[1818] N.C. Sess. L. 1436. The North Carolina Supreme Court read this statute as a prohibition
against investigations into moral character. In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 31, 32-36 (1906).
Did the threat of Communism contribute to the increasing scope of examination? See introductory
paragraphs in Baird, 401 U.S. at 2-3; and Stolar, 401 U.S. at 24-25.
.'401 U.S. at 167.
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There are arguments against any character examination by the bar, as
ihere always are when constitutional rights are limited. However, it is
well established that the states may, within limits, ask questions to
ascertain the moral fitness of applicants before admitting them to the
bar. The state has no right to unlimited inquiry and the applicant has
no right to expect to be free from all inquiry. By prohibiting exclusion
when there is no showing that an applicant has been a member of an
organization with knowledge of its illegal goals and has entertained the
specific intent to further those goals, the Court has extended the rights
enjoyed by public employees to bar applicants.
DAVID M. RAPP
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and the "Right" to Housing
In 1950 California voters adopted article XXXIV of the state con-
stitution with the express purpose of bringing decisions of public housing
authorities which involved the construction of "low rent housing" under
the state's mandatory referendum procedure.' Some twenty years later
the Supreme Court of the United States, in James v. Valtierra,2 upheld
the constitutionality of article XXXIV against the charge that it denied
equal protection of the law to persons who though eligible for low-rent
housing lived in areas in which the referendums were defeated. More
specifically, James raised the issue of whether the requirement of a
referendum to construct "low rent housing" placed an unduly heavy
burden upon low-income persons by singling them out from other classes
of citizens eligible for public housing.
The case was first heard on the district level by a three-judge panel
'"No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any
manner by any state public body until" approved by the majority of the voters in the local electorate
where it is to be developed, constructed, or acquired. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
Article XXXIV was a response to the creation of housing authorities in each city and county
in California. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34240, 34327 (West 1967). These local bodies were
given the power to borrow money and accept grants from the federal government through the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1430 (1970). When the citizen-initiative
referendum procedure of article IV, § I of the state constitution was held inapplicable to decisions
of the local housing authorities in Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d
457 (1950), the stage was set for the passage of article XXXIV six months later.
2402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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in Valtierra v. Housing Authority.3 In ruling that article XXXIV was
unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection, the panel relied heavily
upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hunter v. Erickson.4 In
Hunter, an amendment to the Akron, Ohio city charter that required a
referendum on all ordinances which regulated the use of real property
on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry" was
declared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The amendment,
if approved, would have repealed Akron's recently enacted fair housing
ordinance. As in Hunter, the Valtierra panel found that article XXXIV
created a "special burden" not ordinarily required and that the impact
of that burden fell on minorities.
5
In reversing the panel and holding article XXXIV constitutional,
the Supreme Court, with Justice Black speaking for five justices,' offered
a three-fold rationale in favor of California's right to impose the referen-
dum restriction upon the state's voluntary participation in a federally
financed housing program. First, the majority contended, the district
court's reliance on Hunter was erroneous. The referendum procedure in
Hunter denied equal protection in that it made "distinctions based on
race," whereas California's referendum procedure could not be shown
to be "aimed at a racial minority" and is thus "[racially] neutral on
its face."17 The second prong of the Court's analysis was directed at
showing that even though persons desiring public housing were ham-
pered by the mandatory referendum requirement, they were not thereby
denied equal protection.' In essence, the Court said that legislation that
s313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970). The district court noted that article XXXIV had impeded
the financing of new housing, only 52% of the referendums submitted to the voters having been
approved. The court agreed with plaintiffs' argument that article XXXIV was expressly discrimina-
tory because it applied only to "low income persons" and was therefore squarely within Supreme
Court decisions "forbidding the unequal imposition of burdens upon groups that are not rationally
differentiable in the light of any legitimate State legislative objective." Id. at 4.
'393 U.S. 385 (1969).
5313 F. Supp. at 5.
'Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun
joined. 402 U.S. at 143. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision.
7402 U.S. at 141.
81d. at 142. The Court's argument seemed to be premised on the fear of a flood of litigation.
Assuming that the mandatory referendum procedure that "disadvantages" low income persons in
California denies equal protection, Justice Black foresaw the impossible task of examining entire
governmental structures to determine if their specific provisions "disadvantage" (and thus deny
equal protection to) any particular group of citizens. Id. Consequently, the second argument is
basically a distinction between "disadvantage" and "denial of equal protection."
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is disadvantageous to a certain group is not necessarily in conflict with
the equal protection clause. Finally, the majority emphasized the demo-
cratic nature of the referendum procedure. How, the Court seemed to
ask, could a procedure which gives everyone a voice in the decision
possibly deny equal protection through such a procedure?'
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE
In rejecting the three-judge panel's reading of Hunter, the majority
adopted a narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. It was
content to observe that unlike the statute in Hunter, the California
referendum provision contained no racial classification. No attempt was
made to determine whether any other kind of impermissible classifica-
tion is made by article XXXIV. Thus-the majority stopped short of the
central issue which the case raised-whether the poor constitute a minor-
ity entitled to special protection under the fourteenth amendment. In-
stead, the words "low rent housing" were treated, as the dissent pointed
out, as a "totally benign, technical economic classification."' 0 This in-
terpretation of the equal protection clause not only belied the Court's
earlier dictum in Hunter but was also contrary to the expansive inter-
pretation given that clause by a series of Supreme Court decisions
stretching over three decades.
An understanding of the "new" or expansive concept of equal pro-
tection, and the impact of James upon this concept, must begin with a
brief reference to traditional equal protection standards. The old for-
mula had two ingredients: it required that there be some rational nexus
between the classification and the purpose of the legislation, and it gave
a strong presumption in favor of rationality. 2 Most cases decided under
traditional equal protection criteria involved business regulations, the
great majority of which were upheld."
Though decided on the basis of state violation of the commerce
1Id. at 14243.
t11d. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"1393 U.S. at 393.
32Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. Rav. 767, 768 (1969).
13Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-
Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716, 721 (1969). See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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power, Edwards v. California4 provides a good starting point for consid-
eration of the Court's new approach to equal protection. Justice Jack-
son, in a concurring opinion, stated:
We should say now, and in no uncertain terms. that a man's mere
property status, without more. cannot be used by a state to test, qual-
ify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. "Indigence"
in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them. The
mere status of being without funds is a neutral fact--constitutionally
an irrelevence, like race, creed, or color.'5
The privileges and immunities clause did not, as Jackson advocated in
Edwards, become the tool by which the Court would seek to turn indig-
ence into a "neutral fact." The language which the Court eventually
seized upon was that found in the equal protection clause. Although the
use of equal protection to eliminate discrimination based on poverty has
had only limited application, the rationale for applying it has remained
similar to that expressed in Edwards.6
Only a year after Edwards, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,"7 the tradi-
tional equal protection test, based on judicial restraint, was given a sharp
new twist, and the concept of "invidious discrimination"'' 8 began to
emerge. The formula seemed rather simple. Whenever legislation is
based upon inherently suspect criteria, the burden falls on the state to
justify its actions. Lack of substantial justification constitutes invidious
discrimination and renders the law unconstitutional. 9 The "invidious
discrimination" formula has been the heart of the expansion of the equal
protection clause. The concept, as analyzed by Professor Kenneth L.
Karst, is based upon three inquiries: (1) Has there been discrimination
against a disadvantaged group? (2) Has this disadvantaged group been
denied a "basic right"? (3) Is there a "compelling government inter-
est" 20 which overrides the denial of that basic right?2 Use of the
invidious-discrimination formulation of equal protection has led to the
14314 U.S. 160 (1941).
15Id. at 184.
"See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
19 (1956).
1316 U.S. 535 (1942).
]Id. at 541.
"Karst, supra note 13, at 735.
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
21For a fuller treatment of the tripartite analysis of the invidious discrimination concept, see
Karst, supra note 13, at 739-46.
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recognition of "basic rights" in several areas. Douglas v. California,"2
in which the Court held that an indigent defendant has the same right
to counsel on appeal as a defendant who can afford an attorney, is an
example of the tremendous impact of equal protection in the area of
criminal procedure and of cases that recognize that discriminations
based on wealth may deny equal protection.23 In the civil area, Shapiro
v. Thompson24 held the right to interstate travel abridged by a Connecti-
cut statute that required a residency of at least one year before a person
was eligible for welfare payments. And in the area of voting rights,
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,2? in which the Court declared a
one and one-half dollar poll tax unconstitutional, is one of several cases
26
eliminating property qualifications on equal protection grounds. Other
important affected areas include religion,21 political affiliation,'2  and
marriage and procreation.
29
This development has by no means proceeded in a clear and consist-
ent fashion, as can be seen from the Court's recent decision in Dandridge
v. Williams.3' If the decision in James can be said to have any recent
precedents, surely the Dandridge decision must be foremost, although
any reference to it in the majority opinion in James is strangely missing.
At issue in Dandridge was the adoption by Maryland of a "maximum
grant regulation" 3' for payment of benefits under the Federal Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Using this stan-
dard, an upper limit of 250 dollars a month per family was imposed by
the state, regardless of the number of children in the family. In response
to an equal protection attack, the Court found the regulation in issue to
be in the area of "economics and social welfare" and thus subject only
to the traditional "reasonable basis" test. 32 Although recognizing the
-372 U.S. 353 (1963).
13See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12'(1956).
24394 U.S. 618 (1969).
'383 U.S. 663 (1966).
2'See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam).
2Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
:'Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
"Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
-397 U.S. 471 (1970).
31Id. at 472-76. Because of the nature of the "maximum grant" standard, Dandridge is distin-
guishable from James. Dandridge is not a "poverty" case per se because the decision of the state
to impose a ceiling on AFDC benefits regardless of actual need discriminates not against indigents
generally but against a subclass of indigents-those with large families and thus greater need.
32d. at 485.
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"dramatically real factual difference"3 3 between this case and the earlier
business-regulation cases, the Court refused to apply a different stan-
dard. The majoity implicitly denied the presence of a "basic right" by
noting that its approach would be altered only by state action "affecting
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill oif Rights"" or "infected with a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose or effect such as to make it inherently
suspect. '
35
The decision in Dandridge is not easily understood in light of
Shapiro and Levy v. Louisiana.3 Shapiro, though decided on the basis
of a right of interstate travel, held that a state may not deny welfare
payments solely on the basis of how long a person has lived in the state.
It would seem just as arbitrary to deny a dependent child payments
under AFDC simply because he was born to a large rather than a small
family. 37 In Levy, the Court reversed Louisiana's denial of wrongful
death benefits to children on the sole basis that they were illegitimate.
If illegitimacy is not a rational basis for denial of benefits, how can the
fact of birth to a large family meet the "reasonable basis" test? The
decision in Dandridge need not have considered the newer doctrine of
equal protection; under traditional equal protection standards, a rational
basis for the state regulation was missing s.3 Thus in Dandridge and Levy
there was no need to raise the question of basic rights and its accompa-
nying requirement that the state show a compelling interest. And in
Shapiro the difficult question of whether denial of welfare payments was
*Id. The Court admitted that the cass which were relied upon had "in the main involved state
regulation of business or industry." it went on to note that "[tihe administration of public welfare
assistance, by contrast, involved the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings."
Id. (emphasis added).
Uld. at 484.
"1d. at 485 n.17.
-391 U.S. 68 (1968).
"In striking down the residency requirement in Shapiro, the Court noted that the welfare
benefits in question were "the very means to subsist." The A FDC benefits in Dandridge were just
as essential to subsistence. On this basis Justice Marshall argued that the Court "has already
recognized several times that when a benefit, even a 'gratuitous' benefit, is necessary to sustain life,
stricter constitutional standards . . . are applied to the deprivation of that benefit." 397 U.S. at
522 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus the dissent would place the Dandridge case under the new equal
protection test or, at the least, require more than the majority's showing of "reasonable basis."
"Though Justice Marshall's dissent criticizes the majority opinion for failure to apply the new
equal protection test, note 37 supra, the thrust of his argument is directed toward the failure of the
Maryland regulation to meet the traditional "reasonable basis" test. The state's classification is
said to constitute a denial of equal protection without reference to whether a basic right was
involved. Id. at 517-530.
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a denial of a "basic right" to subsistence was avoided by reference to
the effect of an already established basic right to interstate travel. A
serious problem remains. Why, in Dandridge, upon finding a reasonable
basis for the state regulation, did the Court limit its consideration of
basic rights to guarantees of the Bill of Rights and issues of racial
discrimination? The new concept of equal protection is thus weakened
by the Courts classification of social welfare problems as "economic"
and subject only to the rational-nexus test of traditional equal protec-
tion. The denial of welfare benefits, though "economic" on their face,
results logically in the denial of such basic human needs as food, clo-
thing, and adequate housing. Of course, determination of the point at
which denial of welfare benefits constitutes infringement of other basic
rights may involve the Court in a very difficult task. The arduousness
of the endeavor, however, should not be grounds for refusing to under-
take a resolution of the issue.
An additional factor of considerable importance in recent equal
protection cases has been the willingness of the Court to look beyond a
legislative enactment which is non-discriminatory on its face to see if its
ramifications involve the state or local governmental body in invidious
discrimination. On this basis the Court declared unconstitutional a sec-
tion of the California Constitution which was intended to make possible
private discriminations in the sale or rental of housing. 39
Given this analysis of the development of equal protection, the
majority opinion in James appears to be inconsistent with previous case
law. Justice Black, basically an opponent of the expansive interpretation
of the equal protection clause,4" has breathed new life into the traditional
equal protection interpretation. Under that interpretation racial classifi-
cations are still "constitutionally suspect"4 and "bear a far heavier
burden of justification ' 42 than other classifications. By refusing to ex-
tend Hunter as the three-judge panel had done, the majority has said that
3'Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Accord, Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970). Both cases involved racial discrimination, and in each
case the Court found the state or local government to be "significantly involved in private discrimi-
nations." But cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
"Justice Black's opposition is perhaps most concisely stated in his dissenting opinion in Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); accord, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,
196 (1969) (dissenting opinion). But see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Griffin v. Illinois,
51 U.S. 12 (1956).
"Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
"McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
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the burden of justification falls upon the states only in areas of racial
classification, and thus by implication other classifications, including
those based upon wealth, need only meet the requirement of rationality
unless they infringe upon a basic right. This was the thrust of Justice
Black's dissent in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,43 and it is the
heart of his argument in James.
The concept of "invidious discrimination" still has a very vague
and indefinite meaning for the majority of the Court. Professor Karst's
analysis of invidious discrimination as a series of three inquiries was, at
least fomally, not a part of the majority's approach. But, in a back-
handed manner, the Court did speak to the new concept of equal protec-
tion. Especially noteworthy is the statement that "a lawmaking proce-
dure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal
protection."44 Why is "disadvantage" not synonymous with "denial of
equal protection"? Using the Karst approach, the Court might respond
that though a disadvantaged group exists, they were not denied a "basic
right." And since no basic right is involved, there is no burden of justifi-
cation upon the state. This may account for Justice Black's opinion in
Williams v. Rhodes,4" in which the Court held that Ohio denied equal
protection by refusing to place the candidates of the American Indepen-
dent Party on its ballot. Voting, it appears, is a basic right.
There emerges a dichotomy which requires more explanation than
the Court has provided. Racial classifications, whether or not they imp-
inge upon a basic right, require justification. Undoubtedly, the four-
teenth amendment was framed with the plight of the recently freed slaves
in mind, but the language of that amendment does not indicate that
equal protection of the law was intended to mean only protection from
racial discrimination. Alexander Bickel concluded his study of the Con-
gressional debates over the fourteenth amendment with the following
observation:
Thus. section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, on its face, deals not only
with racial discrimination, but also with discrimination whether or not
based on color. This cannot have been accidental, since the alternative
considered by the Joint Committee, the civil rights formula, did apply
only to racial discrimination. 46
3Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
"402 U.S. at 142.
-393 U.S. 23 (1968).




If Professor Bickel's argument is correct and the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment are framed to deal with more than discrimination
with regard to race, then the Court in James cannot be said to have made
a judgment based on a historical understanding of the amendment's
intent. Rather, the Court made a judgment that the form of classifica-
tion based on race is more likely to produce invidious discrimination
than any other.
If the foregoing analysis of the Court's approach to the equal pro-
tection clause is valid, the problem posed by James, when considered
beside Hunter, is resolved. The classification involved in Hunter was
racial. Since all racial classifications must bear a heavy burden of justifi-
cation, such a burden was placed upon the city. It was not met. James,
on the other hand, did not involve a racial classification. Though the
same "right" to housing was involved in both cases, the non-racial
character of article XXXIV left it free of the burden of justification. This
assumes, of course, that the Court made a determination that the right
of low income citizens to federally financed low-rent housing was not a
"basic right."
The central issue of James should now be apparent: Does the consti-
tutional requirement of a referendum on the issue of "low rent housing"
(as opposed to other types of housing) deny to low income persons a
fundamental right without a compelling state interest in doing so?"
Further reduced, the issue is whether or not low-income persons have a
"basic" right to low-rent housing.4" Arguably a holding that recognized
a basic right to housing, at least as basic as some of those already held
to be so by the Court, could rest upon the ninth amendment49 or the
"By stating the issue in this manner, one of three possible alternatives for application of the
"new" equal protection is found to be the most useful. The alternative of wealth as a suspect
classification was explicitly rejected by the Court in James. By refusing to follow their earlier dicta
in Harper and Hunter the Court found that only racial classifications impose a heavy burden of
justification. A second alternative arising from an earlier discussion of Dandridge-that even
though a particular right in itself is not "basic," the denial of it may nevertheless lead logically to
the denial of other rights which are "basic"-has never been considered by the Court. See text
following note 38 supra. Thus, the third alternative-the invidious-discrimination formula-is
adopted. This approach is founded upon an inquiry as to whether housing in itself is a basic right.
"For instance, the right to interstate travel seems no more "basic" than housing, and yet it
has been protected under the equal protection clause. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
""The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 488-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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penumbra theory of Griswold v. Connecticut. The proposition is put
most squarely by the Congress in the Housing Act of 1949:
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security
of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require
• ..the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family .... 51
The issue of whether housing in this instance is a "basic right" was not
reached by the Court. But one thing is clear from its decision in James.
It has retreated from a number of its earlier statements concerning
poverty and equal protection, such as "[1]ines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race .. .are traditionally disfa-
vored,'1 .2 and "a careful examination on our part is especially warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race. ' 53 Not only has
the Court refused to extend Hunter;54 it has, in James, refuted Justice
White's assurance in Hunter that
the State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making
it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another
of comparable size. 55
In short, the Court has added to the phrase "any particular group" the
proviso "characterized by race."
THE ISSUE OF PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE LEGITIMACY OF STATE
ACTION
The argument that the California law, in this case, has "denied"
nothing is readily apparent. The real effect of article XXXIV is to afford
the opportunity for local electorates to refuse to accept low rent housing.
The Court's emphasis was thus focused on the "concededly broad
power" 56 of the state over its political subdivisions. When asserting a
-381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5tAct of July 15, 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 STAT. 413. The wording is slightly modified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1970).
5 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
uMcDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
m402 U.S. at 141.
0393 U.S. at 393.
mSee Comment, Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Power over Political Subdivi-
sions, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 704,711 (1961).
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constitutional limitation on this power, "it is logical to place a heavy
burden of persuasion on those asserting the limitation.""7 Under this
concept the Court can be seen to have applied an approach of self-
restraint,5" except when there has been an infringement of an express
constitutional provision.59
If the presumption in favor of the legitimacy of state action was
implicit in the Court's approval of article XXXIV, explicit was its reli-
ance on the basically democratic nature of referendums to guarantee the
fairness of the state's action in making the referendum mandatory on
the specific issue of low-rent housing. Whether or not this reliance on
the inherent fairness of referendums was justified is a question that
deserves serious consideration. The majority argued that "provisions for
referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimi-
nation, or prejudice.""0 To substantiate this assertion the Court pointed
to the long use of referendums throughout California history6 and the
requirement of mandatory referendums in other areas. 2 In considering
the Court's first justification, it must be noted that most of California's
"repeated use of referendums"6 13 have been of the citizen-initiative type
rather than mandatory. Careful examination of the Court's second justi-
fication is even more crucial. The Court listed three other instances in
which a referendum is constitutionally mandatory--constitutional
amendments, the issuance of long-term bonds,65 and municipal annexa-
tions and incorporations. 6 Of these three, only article XVIII (constitu-
tional amendments) was in existence before article XXXIV. More im-
portant is the fact that only the language of article XXXIV-"persons
of low income" 67-refers to a disadvantaged class. For instance, it would
be extremely difficult to find a class of persons who would prefer long-
term bond financing to other types of financing and thus be disadvan-
taged by a mandatory referendum before such financing could be carried
571d.
51See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).




'ACAL. CONST. art. XVIII (as amended 1962).
'rCAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 40 (added 1970).
"CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 2(b) (added 1970).
"CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
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out."s Thus the other areas in which mandatory referendums are prov-
ided, with the possible exception of the municipal annexation provision,
involve fundamentally different considerations than article XXXIV.
Even article XI (municipal annexation) does not make a classification
on its face by a reference such as "low rent housing."
On the surface, the referendum procedure guarantees fairness. But
one must also consider the necessity of protecting minorities from the
possibility that the majority's will may be unjust. Alexis de Tocqueville's
warning, issued in 1839, still rings true:
In my opinion the main evil of the present democratic institutions of
the United States does not arise . . . from their weakness, but from
their overpowering strength; and I am not so much alarmed at the
excessive liberty which reigns in that country. as at the very inadequate
securities which exist against tyranny."
The reality which article XXXIV embodies is that the majority, through
a locality-by-locality approach, can decide that low-income persons in
certain areas will not receive low-rent housing. This power is tantamount
to a decision as to where the poor in California may live. As the
Valtierra panel noted, only fifty-two percent of the referendums submit-
ted under article XXXIV have been approved. 70 Thus, no matter how
"democratic" referendums are in theory, the crucial question is whether
or not they are "fair." Has the indigent minority been denied the equal
protection of the law by the article XXXIV requirement that low income
housing proposals be submitted to the whims of the local electorate?
Without denying the broad power of the state over its municipalities, this
question must also be asked and balanced against the presumption that
the state has acted legitimately.
CONCLUSION
James v. Valtierra is the site of two significant collisions. The first
is between two concepts of equal protection-traditional and expansive;
the second is between the equal protection clause and the broad power
6'Cf. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In this case the Court upheld a West Virginia
constitutional provision which required that 60% of the voters in a referendum election approve
bonded indebtedness. The majority stated that it could "discern no independently identifiable group
or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing." Id. at 5.
"'A. DE TocQuEVILLE, DEMtOCRACY IN AMERICA 256 (1839).
70313 F. Supp. at 3.
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of states over their political subdivisions. Avoiding collisions, as any
seaman knows, is the essence of good navigation, but to fail to recognize
these two "collisions." as the Court has done in James, is to make
another collision inevitable.7' Had the Court faced the issues squarely,
the result might have been different. Certainly this analysis indicates that
housing should be considered as "basic" a right as some of those ac-
corded special status by recent Supreme Court decisions preceding
James. It should be clear, also, that reliance on the "democratic" nature
of referendums is not a sufficient deterrent against state denial of equal
protection. One must, however, consider that James may be an attempt
to return to an earlier understanding of the equal protection clause, in
which event an attempt to speak of basic rights, aside from the area of
racial discrimination, would be pointless. Furthermore, one must be
aware that there are legitimate state interests, namely reduction of the
tax base and increased burdens on public facilities, which make low-rent
housing less desirable than other types of housing. Yet, in view of the
complexity of society's problems as a whole, the economic imperatives
demand that housing be the major priority in urban planning. The de-
mand of the equal protection clause seems equally clear-that "the State
may . .. [not] disadvantage any particular group by making it more
difficult to enact legislation in its behalf. ' 72 One must conclude that the
privilege of all Americans to choose their neighbors, however basic,
should not take precedence over the more fundamental right of every
citizen to a decent home.
While the equal protection clause, even in its newer manifestations.
should not be construed as a tool for achieving social egalitarianism, it
may yet play a significant role in narrowing the gap between rich and
poor. That role-essential to republican government-is to protect mi-
norities from the power of local and state electoral majorities who would
use the ballot box to transform their prejudices into law. In their fear
of the broader implications of equal protection, the majority in James
v. Valtierra has retreated from the performance of this essential func-
71Such "collision" may come sooner than expected. In Serrano v. Priest, - Cal. 3d
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), the Supreme Court of California recently ruled the
California School financing scheme, based on property taxes, unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection. In doing so, the court recognized education as a basic right and called for a strict
standard of review. See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, - F. Supp. - (D. Minn. 1971);
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., __ F. Supp. - (W.D. Tex. 1971).
7 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
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tion. Hopefully, that retreat is only a temporary regrouping. and James
may yet be considered as an aberration rather than the initiation of a
trend.
JIM D. COOLEY
Constitutional Law-Fighting Words or Free Speech?
During its history of roughly thirty years, the "fighting words"
doctrine' has been an often cited but seldom controlling limitation in the
area of first amendment freedom of speech. In the recent case of Cohen
v. California,2 the Supreme Court acknowledged the continuing vitality
of the "fighting words" doctrine but rejected the contention of the State
of California that it was controlling in that particular case. Paul Robert
Cohen was convicted of violating a California statute which prohibits
"maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neigh-
borhood or person . . . by . . .offensive conduct."' 3 His arrest resulted
from his wearing a jacket inscribed with "Fuck the Draft" plainly
visible while walking through the Los Angeles County Courthouse.
Cohen claimed that the jacket stated his feelings about the war in Viet-
nam and the draft and that his expression was constitutionally protected.
In affirming Cohen's conviction the California Court of Appeals inter-
preted "offensive conduct" to mean "behavior which has a tendency to
provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." 4 The
'Under the "fighting words" doctrine inflammatory words that are used in a manner calcu-
lated to provoke a breach of the peace are excluded from the first amendment protection generally
afforded speech. The term itself comes from the following passage: "'The English language has a
number of words and expressions which by general consent are "fighting words" when said without
a disarming smile. . . .Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are
threatening, profane or obscene revilings.'" Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942), quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 320, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (1941).
2403 U.S. 15 (1971).
3CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970).
'People v. Cohen, I Cal. App. 3d 94, 100, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasis by the
court). In explaining its interpretation, the court said: "As modified by case law the only 'offensive'
conduct prohibited by section 415 is that which incites violence or has a tendency to incite others
to violence or a breach of the peace. . . .This standard . . . eliminates prosecutions or convictions
for conduct which is merely offensive." Id. at 102, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (emphasis added). Recent
Supreme Court holdings clearly establish that the exercise of constitutional rights may not be
impinged upon merely because the exercise in some way offends the sensibilities ofsome individuals.
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (the flag-burning case), the Court said, "It is
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court found Cohen's behavior so potentially annoying that "it was cer-
tainly foreseeable that such conduct might cause others to rise up to
commit a violent act against the person of the defendant or to attempt
to forceably remove his jacket."5 The California Supreme Court. by a
divided vote, refused to review the case.
6
In attempting to analyze Cohen's conduct in terms of "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements, the California Court of Appeals cited United
States v. O'Brien7 a case in which the defendant had been convicted of
burning his selective service card in protest against the Vietnam war but
in violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act.8 The
Supreme Court in O'Brien upheld the conviction, saying that "when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms." '9 The nonspeech element of Cohen's conduct consisted
of marching through a public building with the intent of attracting
attention to the message on his jacket. Unlike the nonspeech element of
O'Brien's conduct, however, the nonspeech element of Cohen's conduct
was unquestionably legal. The California court failed to make this dis-
tinction, concluding that the expression was likely to produce violence
from viewers and was therefore subject to regulation: "[N]o one has the
firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." In a case involving the
distribution of highly critical leaflets in the home neighborhood of an Austin realtor, the Court said
that "so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptabil-
ity." Organization For a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). On the subject of
freedom of assembly, the Court said: "The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State
to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be 'annoying'
to some people." Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971). The Court considered, and
rejected, the assertion in Cohen that California could censor the four-letter word Cohen used on
the ground that it was "offensive" to the sensibilities of those who might inadvertantly be exposed
to it. 403 U.S. at 22-26.
51 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
GSubsequent to Cohen's conviction and prior to the Supreme Court decision in Cohen, the
California Supreme Court in In re Bushman, I Cal. 3d 767, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375,463 P.2d 727 (1970),
construed § 415, under which Cohen was convicted, for. the first time. Four dissenting United
States Supreme Court justices in Cohen thought it proper to remand the Cohen case to the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the Bushman decision. The majority saw no
substantial difference between the construction of § 415 by the California Supreme Court in
Bushman and that of the Court of Appeals in Cohen.
7391 U.S. 367 (1968).
950 U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1970).
1391 U.S. at 376.
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right to express his views by means of printing lewd and vulgar language
which is likely to cause others to breach the peace to protect women and
children from such exposure."' 0
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of the argument that Cohen's
conviction rested on permissible regulation of the nonspeech element of
his conduct. The conviction, the Court found, rested clearly on the offen-
siveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message. The qustion left
to be resolved, then, was whether the expression could be prohibited
because its use was inherently likely to cause a violent reaction from
viewers. This was the primary basis on which the California court had
affirmed the conviction.
In view of the particular facts involved in Cohen, and the Court's
reaffirmation of "fighting words" as a viable doctrine of constitutional
law, it is instructive to examine Cohen in the context of the history of
that doctrine. Unlike the epithets hurled in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire," the case in which the "fighting words" concept was given
initial explicit recognition by the Supreme Court, Cohen's message
lacked any element of personal abuse or immediate likelihood of retalia-
tion. In discounting the inherently provocative nature of the message on
Cohen's jacket, the Court pointed out that the message was not "'di-
rected to the person of the hearer' 12 and that no individual reasonably
would have regarded the words as a direct personal insult. In Chaplinsky
a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of breaching the peace after calling'
a city marshal a "damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist" when
the marshall tried to warn him that the crowd to whom he had been
speaking was becoming restless. The statute involved forbade addressing
"any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is
lawfully in any street 6dr other public place" or "call[ing] him by any
offense or derisive name."' 3 The statute had been interpreted by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court as limited to the use in a public place of
101 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
11315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
12403 U.S. at 20, quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940). In Cantwell a
Jehovah's Witness was convicted of breach of the peace after playing a phonograph record attack-
ing the Catholic Church while soliciting contributions from two Catholics. The Court overturned
his conviction, noting that although he offended the listeners and aroused their anger, there was
"no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no
personal abuse." '' U.S. at 310.
13315 U.S. at 569.
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words directly tending to cause a breach of the peace by provoking the
person addressed to engage in acts of violence.14 Mr. Justice Murphy,
writing for a unanimous Court, said in Chaplinsky:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.
the profane, the libelous, and the iisulting or 'fighting' words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 5
Seven years after the Chaplinsky decision, the Court in Terminiello
v. Chicago"6 clarified its position as to the kind of speech which would
be excluded from the operation of the doctrine despite the provocative
nature of the message. The case dealt with Terminiello's breach-of-the-
peace conviction following an inflammatory speech he delivered at a
meeting sponsored by the right-wing Christian Veterans of America.
Terminiello differed from Chaplinsky in that Terminiello's speech was
delivered in an auditorium and not on a public street.' 7 A large, hostile
group had gathered in protest outside the auditorium in which Termi-
niello was speaking, and the police were unable to prevent several dis-
turbances from occurring. The trial court had instructed the jury that
any behavior which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance"' s violated the
ordinance. Seizing upon the trial court's interpretation of the ordinance,
the Court reversed Terminiello's conviction on the ground that such an
expansive interpretation of the ordinance would render it unconstitu-
tionally broad. Although the argument before the Court had centered
on the issue of whether Terminiello's speech contained "fighting words"
which carried it outside the scope of first amendment protection, the
Court never reached that issue. 9 Nonetheless, the majority opinion em-
"State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754 (1941).
"5315 U.S. at 571-72.
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phasized that it is often the unsettling effect of speech which gives it
much of its value. The Court said:
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are. or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That
is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment. unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger20 of serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience. annoyance. or unrest. 2'
The majority's opinion in Terminiello evoked a strong dissent from
Mr. Justice Jackson, who felt that in freedom of speech matters the
Court had gone too far in the individual's favor at the expense of the
public interest in order. He contended that excessive efforts in that direc-
tion were self-defeating: "In the long run, maintenance of free speech
will be more endangered if the population can have no protection from
the abuses which lead to violence."
22
Two years after the Terminiello decision was handed down, the
Court took a rather drastic turn in the direction Mr. Justice Jackson had
favored in that case. Feiner v. New York23 involved a statute which, in
effect, forbade incitement of a breach of the peace. Irving Feiner was
arrested after making allegedly inflamatory statements to a group of
Negroes and whites gathered on a street corner. Among other things, he
urged the Negroes to rise up and fight for equal rights. The crowd
became restless and there was some milling around. After asking Feiner
three times to discontinue his speech, the police arrested him. In contrast
20The "clear and present danger" test was originally enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919): "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." One commen-
tator says, "In limited areas the test may still be alive, but it has been conspicuous by its absence
from opinions in the last decade." Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"-A Note on
Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289, 297 (1968). See Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 910-912 (1963), for a history of the
clear and present danger test.
1337 U.S. at 4.
"Id. at 36-37.
-340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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to the Termniniello situation, no disturbances in fact resulted from Fei-
ner's speaking. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld Feiner's convic-
tion after accepting the state court's findings that the arresting officers
were motivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order
and not simply by a desire to suppress Feiner's views and opinions.
The decision in Feiner took the Court quite a distance from the
position stated in Terminiello, in which the Court had spoken approv-
ingly of a function of free speech as being to invite dispute, create
dissatisfaction, and stir people to anger.24 Of course, the Court was
referring to the peaceful dissemination of ideas, but implicit in the
Court's language in Terminiello is the idea that a speaker should enjoy
the protective efforts of the state while he is expressing his ideas, even
though they may be unpopular. In Feiner the Court balanced the individ-
ual's interest in freedom of expression against the societal interest in
order. The case was rightly or wrongly decided depending upon how one
evaluates the facts.2 The majority opinion equated Feiner's expression
to an incitement to riot. The minority found it to be simply an exercise
in soapbox oratory accompanied by the mutterings and unrest which
commonly attend the public exposition of unpopular ideas.
Narrowly construed to cover only incitement to riot when the dan-
ger is real and imminent, Feiner seems to strike a reasonable balance
between individual and societal interests. However, if the rationale for
suppression to preserve order is applied when the danger is not so real
and the disorder not so imminent, "cities and states can with impunity
subject all speeches, political and otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to
the supervision and censorship of the local police. ' 2 Although the Court
did not expressly refer to "fighting words" in Feiner, clearly the Court
balanced the societal interest in order against Feiner's interest in free
expression just as it had balanced similar interests in Chaplinsky. Since
Feiner the Court has consistently protected the public expression of ideas
despite the fact that disturbances might thereby be engendered.
In Cox v. Louisiana,27 the Court overturned the conviction of Rev-
erend Elton Cox for disturbing the peace in connection with a civil rights
march he led in Louisiana. He had urged the marchers to demand service
2337 U.S. at 4.
"There was a difference of opinion among the Justices as to what "facts" were revealed by
the record. 340 U.S. at 321-29 (Black, J., dissenting).
2 1d. at 323.
-379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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at segregated lunch counters. This exhortation was deemed inflamma-
tory by the local sheriff, who attempted thereafter to break up the dem-
onstration. The trial judge stated that bringing 1.500 Negroes into the
business district of Baton Rouge and urging them "'to descend upon
our lunch counters and sit there until they are served' ",28 was an inherent
breach of the peace. The Supreme Court, however, found that the evid-
ence showed only that the opinions and ideas peacefully expressed were
sufficiently opposed to those of the majority of the community to attract
a crowd and necessitate police protection. Quoting an earlier decision,
the Court said. "'[C]onstitutional rights may not be denied simply
because of hostility to their assertion or exercise.' "2' The decision in
Cox is difficult to reconcile with Feiner despite the Court's assertion that
"this situation . . . is 'a far cry from the situation in Feiner . . . .' "I"
In a racially charged situation, Feiner had made unpopular remarks
about the need for Negroes to take action to obtain equal rights, and
his conviction for breaching the peace was affirmed. Cox's remarks were
made in a much more explosive situation, but the Court overturned his
conviction and expressly recognized his right to police protection while
expressing his views in a hostile community .
3
A recent case touching on the "fighting words" doctrine is Street
v. New York. 32 Street was convicted of violating the New York
flag-desecration statute after he had burned an American flag to pro-
test the shooting of James Meredith. Street had said at the time, "If they
did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag" and "We don't
need no damn flag."' 33 The Supreme Court rejected the state's contention
that these statements constituted "fighting words." The Court said:
Nor could such a conviction be justified on the. . . ground mentioned
above: the possible tendency of appellant's words to provoke violent
retaliation. Though it is conceivable that some listeners might have
been moved to retaliate upon hearing appellant's disrespectful words.
we cannot say that appellant's remarks were so inherently inflamma-
tory as to come within that small class of "fighting words" which are
2Id. at 550.
21379 U.S. at 551, quoting Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963).
0379 U.S. at 551, quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963).
31Accord, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).




likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause
a breach of the peace."
In Chaplinsky the Court suggested three possible reasons for hold-
ing Chaplinsky's words to be outside the protection of the first amend-
ment: (1) they "inflict injury," (2) they "tend to create a breach of the
peace," and (3) they "are no essential part of the exposition of ideas.1
35
In judging Cohen by these standards, it is apparent that only the second
could possibly apply. The Court correctly noted that Cohen's message
was not directed at anyone; it clearly was not personal abuse hurled at
a particular individual. Thus it is impossible to maintain that anyone
could be "injured" by Cohen's message in the manner in which one is
injured when subjected to personal abuse of such nature as to be akin
to a physical assault. Furthermore, the words Cohen used were clearly
an "essential part of the exposition of ideas"; there was no exposition
of ideas apart from the display of words on Cohen's jacket. While it is
clear that Cohen could have utilized a less offensive phrase to convey his
message, it is also clear that the words succinctly expressed the idea
Cohen sought to convey. The Court noted that "much linguistic expres-
sion serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas
capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
pressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force."36
To allow the suppression of speech because it may tend to create a
breach of the peace is to open the door to censorship of unpopular views
by those ready and willing to create a disturbance to silence speakers
with whom they disagree.37 The Court came perilously close to this in
Feiner but since that holding has consistently held that constitutional
rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their exercise.38
In Cohen there was no evidence that anyone had even threatened a
"Id. at 592, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
1315 U.S. at 571-72. See Lowey, Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate In Flag Desecra-
lion, 49 N.C.L. REV. 48, 82 (1970), for a discussion of whether flag desecration can constitute
"fighting words" for any of these three reasons.
3403 U.S. at 26.
37This fear is expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951)
(dissenting opinion).
38See, e.g.. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). For a discussion of the need for tolerance
of unpopular views, see Pollitt, Free Speech For Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REV. 39
(1967).
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disturbance. In reversing the conviction, the Court reiterated that "'an
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance . . . is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' "-39
What then distinguishes "fighting words" from ordinary words?
Fighting words "inflict injury" and "tend to create a breach of the
peace." Clearly, the Court in Chaplinsky had reference to terms so
strongly abusive as to be analogous to a physical assault. In Cohen no
epithets were employed, and the message was not directed at any particu-
lar individual. Thus the message lacked the highly personal nature which
characterized the insult in Chaplinsky. The highly personal nature of the
insult, the degree of abusiveness in the insult, and the immediacy of the
probable retaliation distinguish fighting words from other words. It is
impossible to list the words which might constitute fighting words when
hurled as an insult; they vary with the times and with the local customs
of people. In the 1940's "Fascist" was a highly abusive term, and in the
1950's and 1960's "Communist" was often used in name-calling. The
determinative factor is the manner in which the words are used. When
highly abusive words a're used in a manner so provocative as to virtually
assure retaliation, the "fighting words" doctrine operates to exclude
such expression from first amendment protection. As Cox, Street, and
Cohen indicate, the societal interest in order must clearly outweigh the
individual interest in expression to justify application of the narrow
doctrine of "fighting words."
JOSEPH E. WALL
Constitutional Law-Torts -Defamation and the First Amendment: The
Elements and Application of the Reckless-Disregard Test
On June 7, 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its latest decision concerning the conflicting interests of state libel law
and the first amendment. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia1 was a libel action
brought by a distributor of a nudist magazine against a radio station
for broadcasting defamatory news bulletins concerning his arrest for
11403 U.S. at 23, quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969).
1403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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selling obscene literature and his lawsuit against the city and police
officials and several local news media. The eight justices who considered
the case filed five separate opinions. A brief consideration of two cases
leading up to this decision will help determine why the Court was so
bitterly divided.
In 1964 the Supreme Court held in New York Times v. Sullivan
2
that the first amendment precludes recovery by a public official for a
defamatory falsehood concerning his official conduct in the absence of
a showing that the falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false. Finding the case
to be a proper one for review of the evidence, 3 the Court held that there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding of intentional or reckless
falsehood and remanded.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,' a 1967 case, the Court consid-
ered the effect of the first amendment upon the right to recover for
defamation of one who, although not a public official, is before the
public eye by voluntary conduct. Mr. Justice Harlan for the plurality
opined that "public figures" can recover upon a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct,- on which point he felt the evidence sufficient.
Chief Justice Warren, whose separate opinion was the lowest common
denominator and thus the holding of the Court,6 thought a finding of
intentional or reckless falsehood to be required for public figures as well
as public officials. However, he agreed that the evidence was sufficient
to support such a finding,
Rosenbloom could have been decided on the ground that plaintiff
was a public figure required under Butts to prove intentional or reckless
falsehood. George Rosenbloom had, after all, voluntarily undertaken to
become a distributor of nudist magazines. No doubt he recognized the
controversial nature of the magazines. The defendant radio station in-
deed argued that by so doing the plaintiff had assumed the risk of public
exposure and furthermore that his arrest and institution of a novel law-
2376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'For a discussion of appellate review of constitutional fact see Strong, The Persistent Doctrine
of"Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1968).
'388 U.S. 130 (1967).
5By "highly unreasonable conduct" Justice Harlan apparently meant gross negligence.
6388 U.S. at 162. Three justices held that reckless disregard is required for public figures.
Justices Black and Douglas held that there can be no recovery for even intentional falsehoods.
Therefore, at least five justices would not allow recovery without a showing of reckless disregard.
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suit added to his status as a public figure. 7 However, the Court assumed
without discussion that the plaintiff was not a public figure and thus
reached the issue of the effect of the first amendment on libel actions
brought by private individuals. Mr. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
stated that a private citizen cannot recover for a defamatory falsehood
concerning a matter of legitimate public interest in the absence of a
showing of intentional or reckless falsehood. Mr. Justice White con-
curred in the result but limited his opinion to cases involving the conduct
of public officials, such as the action by police in arresting Mr. Rosen-
bloom.8 Add Mr. Justice Black's absolutist opinion-that the first
amendment bars recovery even for intentional falsehoods'-and the
White opinion as lowest common denomenator becomes the holding of
the Court. 0 Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Marshall" opined that a pri-
vate plaintiff can recover for libel upon a showing of ordinary negli-
gence, whether or not a matter of legitimate public interest is involved.
Mr. Justice Brennan took the position that the basis for the New
York Times rule was protection of first amendment interests, which
include not only self-governance but also all matters of legitimate public
concern. "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved,
or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to
become involved."' 2 Thus, if New York Times is right, the argument
continues, so is the position taken by the plurality. Justice Brennan
further held that the reckless-disregard standard is required because self-
censorship induced by the threat of a libel judgment offends the first
amendment, and any standard of protection less than reckless disregard
will result in self-censorship.1 3 He concluded that there is a constitutional
privilege to report on matters of general or public interest, and that the
7Brief for Respondent at 18 n.5.
8403 U.S. at 57.
vd. at 57.
lrrhe White opinion is the lowest common denominator in that at least five justices extend
this much protection to defendants. With respect to plaintiffs, the Brennan plurality opinion repre-
sents the minimum protection that at least five justices are willing to extend.
"Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 62. Mr. Justice Marshall authored
a dissent in which Mr. Justice Stewart concurred. Id. at 78.
12 d. at 43.
"3Whether self-censorship or exercise of ordinary care is what would result if the negligence
standard urged by Justice Harlan were adopted is, of course, unknown. One might feel that there
is a substantial risk of self-censorship and that it is better to err in favor of free debate.
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privilege may be defeated only by a showing that the publisher acted with
reckless disregard of the truth, evidence thereof being reviewable on
appeal.
Justices Harlan and Marshall, contrary to Mr. Justice Brennan,
held that New York Times was based in part upon our history of sedi-
tious libel and upon the proposition that when public officials are in-
volved the state interest does not fully apply. In support of this latter
proposition, Harlan argued that a public official has access to the media
to correct false statements and that he assumes the risk of defamatory
publications.' Thus, while public officials must prove reckless disregard
to recover for libel, public figures (who also have access to the media
and assume the risk) need only provegross negligence because as to them
there is no seditious libel consideration. As to private plaintiffs, the state
interest fully applies, and ordinary negligence is adequate protection of
the constitutional interests involved. Justices Harlan and Marshall both
expressed concern that the plurality's ill-defined reckless-disregard stan-
dard and insistance upon appellate review of evidence would result in
"ad hoc balancing" of the federal and state interests; 5 they forecast as
consequences a lack of predictability and undue involvement of the
Court in the fact-finding process. Justice Harlan's concern therefore was
to discern "generally applicable rules that should balance with fair preci-
sion the competing interests at stake."' 8 Justices Marshall and Harlan
were also offended by the necessity under the plurality view for a judicial
determination of what constitutes a matter of legitimate public interest,
a determination which they felt to be beyond judicial competency.
Assuming that the plurality view does become law, a plaintiff in-
volved in a public event may nevertheless recover for libel if: (1) the
defaming statement is false, and (2) it is knowingly or recklessly uttered.
The first element, falsity, is traditionally presumed. 7 There is dictum in
another Supreme Court case, Rosenblatt v. Baer,'" however, to support
"For a discussion questioning the validity of the access-to-the-media argument, see Kalven,
The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267.
As for assumed risk, this is but a legal conclusion that a public figure cannot recover for non-
reckless libel, and can in no wise be considered a reason for withholding recovery.
"SFor a discussion of "ad hoc" and "definitional balancing" with respect to the first amend-
ment, see Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Branden-
burg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 58-80.
16403 U.S. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'7Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
19383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966).
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the contention that New York Times has shifted the burden to the
plaintiff to prove falsity. At least two federal cases have placed the
burden on the plaintiff without discussion.' 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, on the other hand, recently held that the burden is still on the
defendant .2 The language in Rosenblatt was read to mean that if the
defendant offers proof of truth, then the plaintiff must overcome that
proof. The court reasoned that the presumption of innocence applies to
the plaintiff in an action for defamation, thus raising a presumption that
a defamatory statement is false, and that placing the burden on the
plaintiff would put him in the difficult position of having to prove a
negative.
The second essential element required to defeat the defendant's con-
stitutional privilege is that the statement be made with knowledge that
it is false or reckless disregard as to whether the statement is false. If
falsity is presumed, what happens when it is shown that prior to publica-
tion the defendant was in a position to know whether his statements were
true or false? For example, if the plaintiff shows that the defendant's
correspondent was present when he allegedly led a crowd of people
against national guardsmen in order to block integration,2" would a
presumption of falsity create a presumption of intentional falsity?2 Ap-
parently the answer of the Pennsylvania court is "yes." Thus when the
defendant had enough personal knowledge of the plaintiff to know
whether his statements about her were true or false, and when falsity was
presumed without proof, the defendant was found to have acted with
knowledge of falsity.2 Such a result clearly seems contrary to New York
Times: "Such a presumption is inconsistent with the federal rule."12
When the plaintiff shows that the defendant knew a statement was
false, there is no constitutional problem since the first amendment does
not protect intentional falsehoods.25 However, the defendant's knowl-
edge of falsity must exist with respect to the false impression created in
the mind of his audience. If he knows that the plaintiff is being sued in
civil court, but his publication creates the impression that the plaintiff
"Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969); Sellers v. Time Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
2'Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
2'Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
12Similarly, presumed falsity would be projected into presumed reckless-disregard.
2Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
2376 U.S. at 283-84.
?'Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
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is subject to criminal charges, his falsehood is intentional only if he
knows that he is creating this false impression.26 Also, knowledge must
exist at the time of publication, and failure to retract after notice of
falsity will not suffice.27 Finally, the kind of knowledge required is actual
and subjective; the mere fact that there is information in the defendant's
files which is contrary to his publication does not constitute such knowl-
edge. 
28
When knowing falsehood is not shown, and the plaintiff relies on
reckless disregard, the problem of balancing state and federal interests
arises. While the Supreme Court has formulated no comprehensive test
of reckless disregard, it has provided some meaningful guidelines. It
must be found that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication," 29 that is, that he acted with a "high
degree of awareness" of probable falsity.3 However, in Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts 31 a nationally famous college football coach was falsely
charged with having fixed a football game, and the finding of the requis-
ite degree of awareness was based upon the following criteria: (1) defen-
dant knew that the informant relied upon was on probation in connec-
tion with check violations, (2) only a football expert could competently
have inferred from the notes taken by the informant upon overhearing
the conversation alleged to be a fix that the game was in fact fixed, and
(3) Wally Butts and his daughter protested to the defendant prior to
publication that the charges were false. The Court emphasized that the
defendant had embarked upon a policy of "sophisticated muckraking"
to increase circulation and was not reporting "hot news. '32 If Butts can
be reconciled with the "high degree of awareness" requirement, it can
be only by consideration of the two major interests involved, the factors
which affect each, and the manner in which they are balanced under the
reckless-disregard standard.
The state's interest is in "compensating individuals for actual, mea-
surable harm caused by the [wrongful] conduct of others"3 3 and in deter-
ring future wrongful conduct. The greater the harm, the greater the
"Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707,459 P.2d 8 (1969).
"New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286-87 (1964).
23ld. at 287.
2St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
"Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74 (1964).
3'388 U.S. 130 (1967).
M2d. at 157-58.
P403 U.S. at 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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state's interest. In the area of libel, the amount of harm done is generally
proportional to the severity of the charges made. The constitutional
interest is in promoting "a citizenry informed by a free and unfettered
press ' 34 with special sensitivity to seditious libel. The three factors which
most strongly affect this interest are the proximity to seditious libel, the
public need to be informed. about a matter, and the possibility of self-
censorship resulting from the threat of liability. The reckless-disregard
standard should be expected to deal with each of these factors in one way
or another.
Since reckless disregard is a subjective standard3 5 the relevant in-
quiry is what evidence is required to show it, evidence being reviewable
on appeal. The plaintiff Will generally try to show that facts were known
to the defendant which would cause an average man to perceive that
there was a substantial risk of falsity. From this the jury may infer that
defendant did in fact so perceive. The greater the risk of falsity actually
appreciated by the defendant, and the more severe the charges, the more
likely a finding of reckless disregard. Also, as' the appreciated risk3"
increases, the minimum required level of severity decreases until at the
point where the appreciated risk approaches one hundred percent-that
is, when the defendant has actual knowledge of falsity-the charges need
only be severe enough to create some state interest in compensation or
deterrence. Conversely, as the severity of the charges increases, the re-
quisite appreciated risk decreases.3 7 Thus in Butts, notwithstanding that
Uld. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,730-31 (1968).
6The appreciated risk is the actual risk to the extent that it is perceived by the defendant. The
actual risk, on the other hand, is the probability of falsity given the facts known or readily knowable
to the defendant. When the risk of falsity is 85% but the evidence does not warrant an inference
that this risk was fully perceived by the defendant, then the appreciated risk is somewhat less than
85% (perhaps 65%, for example). But a 25% risk fully perceived constitutes a 25% appreciated risk.
nThe approximate relationship between appreciated risk and severity (which might range from
zero to one, for example) can be expressed symbolically:
(appreciated risk) (severity of the charges + K ! ) is greater than K I
The constant K1 has a magnitude determined by our concept of how much fault is required to
constitute recklessness. When the inequality holds, defendant is reckless (as distinguished from
reckless disregard which, as will be shown, is cognizant of other variables.) The above expression
was used rather than the simpler formulation
(appreciated risk) (severity) is greater than K1
because it was necessary to show that when appreciated risk approaches 100%, the severity need
only be large enough to create some state interest but need not be of the magnitude of K I . In
other words, the product of appreciated risk and severity simply expresses the amount of harm likely
to occur through falsity, which need not be large when we are dealing with intentional falsehood.
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the evidence does not seem to support a finding of "a high degree of
awareness of probable falsity"--that is, of high appreciated risk-the
defendant was said to be reckless3 owing to the fact that the charges
were severe. Thus the Court was arguably correct in finding that the
defendant acted with reckless disregard, unless factors which represent
the constitutional interest were present in such a magnitude as to make
the defendant's conduct justifiable in some sense.
Whether a defendant's conduct can be said to be justifiable9 will
necessarily depend upon two factors: the magnitude of the constitutional
interest in his communication,'" and the burden of verifying his informa-
tion. Even if there is a very strong public interest in given subject mat-
ter,"4 if the defendant's information might easily and quickly be verified,
then his reckless conduct can hardly be said to be justifiable-. On the
other hand, when verification would be difficult and expensive, requiring
it would have the general effect of depriving the public of communica-
tion. When the public need for the information is great, then even con-
duct of a marginally reckless magnitude may be protected as justifiable;
hence reckless disregard is said not to exist. Even when the public interest
and burden are great, however, conduct that is of an extremely reckless
nature will not be protected. As previously noted, 2 there is some doubt
as to the competency of courts to determine the public interest in given
subject matter. Apparently, however, the courts do weigh public interest,
38For the purposes of this note, "recklessness" and "reckless disregard" are treated as techni-
cal terms having different meanings. "Recklessness" considers only appreciated risk and severity,
while "reckless disregard" considers these factors plus public or constitutional interest and
burden of verification.
39"Justifiability" as used in this note is analogous to but distinct from justification concepts
in negligence. In negligence, a risk created by the defendant may be justified by the social utility of
his conduct if the only alternative to the risk would impose a prohibitive burden on the conduct
and hence deprive the public of a valuable social utility. In such a case the defendant is not at fault.
Justifiability is analogous in that when the public interest in defendant's publication is great, and
the burden of verification is prohibitive, the defendant's conduct may be justifiable (resulting in no
-liability) notwithstanding the fact that he has acted recklessly. Justifiability is distinct from justifi-
cation in that with respect to justifiability the defendant is still at fault.
"0Where seditious libel considerations are present, the constitutional interest in protecting the
defendant's communication is greatest for two reasons. Firstly, the public interest in effective self-
governance is present. Secondly, there may be an additional constitutional interest involved because
of the special sensitivty to seditious libel. And this latter, if present, would not be mitigated by the
lack of a substantial burden of verification.
"Of course there is no public interest in the dissemination of false statements. When the public
interest in a defendant's communication is referred to herein, what is meant is the public interest
in dissemination of the statements assuming them to be true.
"See text following note 16 supra.
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covertly or overtly, though they tend to be less influenced by it than the
other factors already discussed.
43
Thus in Butts, the Court emphasized that the Saturday Evening
Post had embarked upon a policy of "sophisticated muckraking."'" The
Minnesota Supreme Court read this portion of Butts to mean that defen-
dant's publication was serving its own commercial interests (to bolster
circulation) rather than the public interest.45 The Minnesota court also
concluded that while Butts extended the reckless-disregard standard to
public figures, less evidence is required to establish reckless disregard in
an action by a public figure than in an action by a public official.46
Presumably this is because the constitutional interest is greater when an
action is brought by a public official because of the proximity to sedi-
tious libel. The Court in Butts also emphasized that the defendant's
arhe burden of verification may have a value anywhere from zero (no burden) to infinity
(verification impossible). When verification is impossible, the public interest fully applies. When
there is no burden (verification might be accomplished quickly and easily), then the public interest
does not apply at all because imposition of the burden will not tend to deprive the public of
communication. Thus, as the burden increases from zero to infinity, the facor by which the public




Since public interest is a means of finding reckless conduct justifiable by increasing the magnitude
of recklessness required to establish reckless disregard, it should be added to K I on the right-hand
side of the inequality set out in note 37 supra: '
(appreciated risk) (severity + K) K (public interest) 
(burden)
I K 3 X(burden + K 2)1
Public interest is divided by K3 , a constant greater than one, to indicate that courts, feeling
incompetent to determine the weight to accord the public interest in a given communication, will
not consider public interest to the extent they consider other factors.
Since proximity to seditious libel is a constitutional interest not affected by burden of verifici-
cation, a variable denoting the value of this interest should be added to the right-hand side of the
inequality:
.(public interest) (burden) "
(appreciated risk) (severity + K' (pb 3 i (burden) + (seditious libel)
(b X urden + A' 2
388 U.S. at 158.
4Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 239, 154 N.W.2d 409,413 (1967).
61d. at 262; 154 N.W.2d at 427-28.
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publication was not "hot news."4 The defendant in Rosenbloom con-
tended in his brief that the relevance of "hot news" is that requiring
verification of each item would deprive the public of the valuable service
provided by publishing news as it happens. 8 Finally, the Court in Butts
noted that elementary and easily taken precautions were open to the
defendant but were ignored.49 All this implies that there was no over-
whelming constitutional or public interest which the defendant was serv-
ing, and even if there was, it was not fully applicable because the burden
of verification was only slight.
Analysis to determine whether the first amendment bars a recovery
for libel should determine first whether a matter of public interest (or a
public official or figure) was involved and, if so, whether the statement
was false (this may depend on who has the burden of proof).5" If both
of these inquires are answered affirmatively, it should then be determined
whether the falsehood was intentional. If so, the first amendment privi-
lege is defeated; if not, it must finally be determined whether defendant
acted recklessly and, if so, whether his conduct was justifiable. If
unjustifiable recklessness does appear, the first amendment will not bar
recovery.
Certain general conclusions can be drawn from a reading of the
cases on reckless disregard-that is, unjustifiable recklessness-and ex-
plained in terms of the variables discussed above. Whether or not the
public interest in the defendant's communication is great. he cannot be
considered reckless in relying on a third party in the absence of obvious
reasons to doubt that person's veracity. He may rely on a news service, 5'
or individuals known to have good character, 52 or one whose veracity is
unknown,53 or even on a single source representing only one side of a
controversy.54 In all such cases, it cannot be said that the defendant is
taking a meaningful appreciated risk.
On the other hand, where there are obvious reasons for disbelieving
statementsof a third party, then a substantial appreciated risk arises and
11388 U.S. at 157.
"8Brief for Respondent at 31-32.
11388 U.S. at 157.
5OSee text at note 19 supra.
"Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
"2New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
OSt. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
mNew York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
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the defendant may be found to have been reckless, and justifiability
again will depend on the magnitude of the constitutional interests. Thus
when the defendant relies on a layman of doubtful veracity to draw
inferences of serious misconduct and when it is obvious that those infer-
ences may be competently drawn only by an expert, he has been held
reckless 5s Nor may the defendant rely on an anonymous phone call,"0
since one who will not disclose his identity is inherently unreliable. Nor
may he rely on one of good reputation known to be relating hearsay
from an unreliable source, when the charges made are improbable and
severe. 57 Finally, when the defendant relies solely upon statements made
by a prison inmate who with obvious reason to lie (his own freedom)
makes severe charges (murder, witness tampering, malicious prosecu-
tion), he may be considered reckless. And even when strong constitu-
tional interests exist (self-governance, seditious libel) and means of veri-
fication do not, if the defendant also knows that the informant's state-
ments are completely inconsistent with known material facts, the con-
duct is too reckless to be justifiable."
If the defendant bases an inference on facts known or believed to
be true, he will be protected unless the severity and improbability of that
inference are of reckless magnitude. 59 Thus the defendant is not reckless
in drawing a conclusion of improper conduct from the fact that qounty
paving equipment was seen in use in paving a county official's driveway,
and he will not be liable even though he might easily have learned
whether the plaintiff official had paid for the service. 0 The defendant
may infer from a thorough knowledge of the plaintiff's political philoso-
phy that the plaintiff is a fascist; from the fact that plaintiffs newspaper
printed articles which the defendant believes increased the risk of race
riots that the plaintiff is a race riot promoter; and from the fact that a
OCurtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
1St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (dictum).
7Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
mlndianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, -nd _259 N.E.2d 651 (1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 930 (1970).
5 Since the manner in which people draw inferences is not always logical, especially if the one
inferring is not sophisticated or is influenced by emotion or prejudice, it must appear not only that
the inference is illogical but also that the defendant probably did not believe it himself before a
meaningful appreciated risk arises on which a finding of reckless disregard can be predicated.
Furthermore, there is generally a privilege under state law to express opinion, at least when the
factual basis for the opinion also appears. Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W.
323 (1901).
"Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., 448 P.2d 337 (Hawaii 1968).
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cartoon in plaintiffs newspaper depicted a judge and made reference to
his Jewish ancestory that the plaintiff is a Jew-baiter." Even when the
drawing of the defendant's inference borders on recklessness, when he
concludes from a tenuous past relationship that the plaintiff is a col-
league of two United States fugitives, if the public interest is great
(organized crime), and the burden of verification is difficult, if not pro-
hibitive, the defendant will not be held to have acted with unjustifiable
recklessness 62
However, if the facts tend to negate rather than support an infer-
ence, as when defendant concludes that a murder-suicide was the act of
the "happiest mother in town," the inference can be said to be a fabrica-
tion which the defendant must have strongly suspected, if not known,
to be untrue.63 And when the defendant's lay opinion is obviously incapa-
ble of accurately inferring serious misconduct from a few facts believed
to be true and expert opinion is available, the defendant's drawing of
those inferences over the plaintiff's protest of falsity will not receive first
amendment protection, at least in the absence of strong constitutional
interests. 4
Two lawsuits resulting from the same set of facts and the same
publication yielded one United States district court 65 and two circuit
court of appeals66 opinions which are seemingly unreconcilable with the
formulation discussed above. The defendant had put together an article
concerning the arrest of several "Cosa Nostra big wigs." The article
pictured a group of these men at a dinner with two lawyers, Ragano and
Wasserman, who had been hired to defend them. Originally the two
attorneys were referred to as "mouthpieces," but this reference was
deleted or lost in the editing process. The result was that a reader of the
article would have the impression that defendant's reference to the pic-
tured group as "hoodlums" included the two attorneys. Ragano
brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.6" the trial judge denied the defendant's motion for summary
6trait v. King Broadcasting Co., I Wash. App. 250, 460 P.2d 307 (1969). A possible factor in
this case is that the plaintiff as a newspaper editor clearly had access to the media.
"rTime, Inc. v. MeLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 609, 610 n.I (2d Cir. 1968).
"Curis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
"Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
"Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
67Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
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judgment but permitted an interlocutory appeal. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed. 8 Both the district and the court of appeals held that there was a
genuine issue of fact as to reckless disregard. The D.C. Circuit was in
accord and reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in
an action by the other attorney, Wasserman.69 The basis for the holding
was that defendant knew plaintiffs to be lawyers but nevertheless referred
to them as "hoodlums." The plaintiffs appear to have little chance of
showing that the article was defamatory as a result of anything more
than bureaucratic negligence in editing. Perhaps the denial of summary
judgment indicated nothing more than that plaintiffs should be given the
chance to prove at trial that defendant's reporters realized the defama-
tory nature of its article. On the other hand, in light of the reviewability
of constitutional fact as recognized by Judge Skelly Wright. concurring
in Wasserman,70 this seems unlikely. Two other possible justifications
present very interesting problems in this area of the law.
One justification for Ragano and Wasserman is implicit in the
statement of District Judge Krentzman:
[flailure to delineate fact from opinion in such characterizations would
have a deterrent effect upon the availability of attorneys to represent
persons accused of crime and could foreseeably result in frustrating the
constitutional rights of an accused to secure services of counsel of his
choice."
Hence, there is a conflict between the first amendment and the sixth
amendment. If this is indeed the explanation of Ragano, then the impli-
cations are highly significant. The courts have not dealt so far with the
conflict between fair trial and the New York Times doctrine, but it is a
problem they will almost certainly have to face.
The second possible explanation for Ragano is that there is going
to be some erosion of the reckless-disregard standard in certain instances
in order to shift the "cost of doing business" to the news industry. Such
an inroad on New York Times would almost certainly be concerned
primarily with situations in which the harm results from faults in the
operaton of bureaucracies rather than expressions of points of view. The
6rTime, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970).
69Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
'
0 Id. at 922-23.
71Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (emphasis added).
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extent and limits of such a doctrine can only be matters of speculation
at this time.
The reckless-disregard standard is very complex and may be diffi-
cult to apply.72 If the Supreme-Court decides many of these cases, the
complexity of the application of the standard combined with the necess-
ity for constitutional fact-finding may prove to be an unhappy burden
on an already greatly overworked Court. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the quality of the Court's work has already begun to suffer.73
In light of these considerations, perhaps Mr. Justice Harlan's desire to
formulate simple rules which can be easily and quickly applied without
pulling the Court so far into the fact-finding process can be appreciated.
KENNETH S. CANNADAY
Military Law-Retroactivity of the Service-Connection Test of the Juris-
diction of Courts-Martial
Throughout the history of the United States, the relationship of the
nation's military establishment to the civilian'government has been a
recurring problem. One facet of this relationship that has resulted in
significant tension concerns the proper division of jurisdiction between
the military and civilian courts. The determination of when a particular
defendant is subject to military jurisdiction is difficult because of the
inherent stress between constitutional guarantees in the application of
military justice.' Several constitutional provisions 2 and a myriad of fed-
eral statutes3 deal with the military's jurisdiction over its members. The
problem is complicated because these provisions are not always consist-
ent.4
The difference between the civilian and military systems of justice
lies in the denial to military personnel of some of the protections of the
"See note 43 supra.
"See Strong, The Time Has Come To Talk of a Major Curtailment in the Supreme Cori's
Jurisdiction, 48 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1969), and commentators cited therein.
'Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 362 (1971).
'See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
'The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
UCMJ], sets out the general scheme of military justice.
'For example, until 1957 precisely how the Bill of Rights applies to servicemen was uncertain.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
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Bill of Rights.5 Although only the right to a grand jury indictment is
specifically denied to servicemen by the Constitution,6 the military trial
procedure that evolved in the early years of the United States was based
upon standards enacted by Congress under its article I power to make
laws to regulate and control the armed forces and not upon constitu-
-tional guarantees. 7 For example, pursuant to this authority Congress
formulated a system of military justice that excluded the right to trial
by jury.' The federal courts traditionally have been hesitant to involve
themselves in the developments of the system of military justice primar-
ily because of the differences in the constitutional sources of power of
the two systems.' Consequently, servicemen are allowed to move from
the military to the civilian courts only through a petition for habeas
corpus'0 and only after the exhaustion of all military remedies."
5See Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1, 27-36 (1958). But see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1957).
'U.S. CONST. amend V.
7U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army, 13
VAND. L. REv. 435, 445-53 (1960).
5UCMJ art. 22-29, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-29 (1970).
9Military courts are said to draw their authority from article I rather than article i or the
Constitution. Comment, Civilian Court Review of Court-Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUI, L.
REV. 1259, 1274 (1969). The limited power of the civilian courts to review mi';tary affairs was
recognized as early as 1858. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858). More recent cases
have demonstrated the continuing deference of the civilian courts to the military courts. See, e.g.,
Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583, 584 (1956); Swisher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 921, 928
(W.D. Mo. 1965) aff'd., 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966). The UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970)
states that all court-martial decisions following appeal within the military process are "final and
conclusive."
"0See UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970). The civilian courts may receive military eases
only by a petition for habeas corpus. This petition must allege a failure of military jurisdiction, a
defect in the composition of the court-martial, or a defect in the sentencing procedure. Wurfel,
Military Habeas Corpus 11, 49 MICH. L. REV. 699, 713 (1951). Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
reh. denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953), allows habeas corpus review of military decisions that fail to give
"full and fair consideration" to the assertion of a constitutional right by the defendant. The history
of the military appellate procedure demonstrates, however, that such rights are virtually always
accorded the "full and fair consideration" required. Between 1953 and 1965 the federal courts did
not grant a single petition for habeas corpus based on failure of "full and fair consideration" in
the military system. Comment, 69 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 9, at 1265. However, some recent
cases may portend an expansion in the scope of review on habeas corpus by civilian courts of court-
martial decisions. For example, in Allen v. VanCantfort, 446 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1971), noted in
50 N.C.L. REV. 173 (1971), it was held that federal district courts must review allegations of
UCMJ statutory error. For a recent interpretation of the scope of review by the civilian courts, see
Everett, CollateralAttacks on Court-Martial Convictions, II JAG L. REV. 399 (1969).
"Everett, supra note 10, at 399 & 401 n.16.
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It was on such a petition in O'Callahan v. Parker12 that the Su-
preme Court rejected the military status of the defendant as the jurisdic-
tional test of military courts and adopted in its place the "service-
connection" of the crime as the proper jurisdictional test.)3 The Court
indicated that unless the crime was service-connected, the defendant
could be tried only in civlian courts. However, the opinion was silent as
to the possible retroactive application of its principle. Following a year
and a half of attempts by lower courts to put legalistic flesh on the
jurisdictional skeleton of O'Callahan," the Supreme Court in Relford
v. Commandant 5 granted certiorari 6 to Corporal Isiah Relford's peti-
tion for habeas corpus to discuss the "scope and retroactivity of
O'Callahan." Because it decided that Relford's crimes were service-
connected, the Court sustained the military's jurisdiction to try him.
More importantly, this outcome negated the necessity to consider the
issue of the retroactivity of the O'Callahan decision. 7
The issue of the retroactive application of O'Callahan is a problem
of significant magnitude in both the military and civilian court systems.
A retroactive application of the service-connection test would affect
hundreds of thousands of servicemen and ex-servicemen tried by' military
courts. 8 It could disturb convictions dating from 1916'9 and affect possi-
'395 U.S. 258 (1969).
'3Id. at 272.
"E.g., Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Mercer v. Dillon, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.M.R. 264 (1970); United States v. King, 40 C.M.R. 1030 (1969).
4 40I U.S. 355 (1971).
1397 U.S. 934 (1970).
11401 U.S. at 369.
'"Brief for Respondent at 28, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). The administra-
tive effect of complete retroactive application of O'Callahan could indeed be staggering. The Judge
Advocate General of the United States Army estimates that over 1,300,000 men have been court-
martialed in the Army alone since 1951 and that as many as one third of those convictions could
be overturned. Id. Another estimate sets the number at over 4,000,000 courts-martial in the Army
alone since 1917. Thompson v. Parker, 308 F. Supp. 904, 908 (M.D. Pa. 1970). One court observed
that the Army, Navy, and Air Force conducted approximately 74,000 courts-martial in fiscal 1968.
Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 268, 41 C.M.R. 264, 268 (1970). The problem would be
complicated by staleness of the record in many instances and the impossibility of gathering wit-
nesses and evidence for de novo trials. Brief for Respondent at 29, Relford v. Commandant, 401
U.S. 355 (1971). See Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civil-
ian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1, 44 (1969). These
problems militate against a retroactive application of O'Callahan and persuaded the Court of
Military Appeals in Mercer and two district courts, see note 23 infra., to apply O'Callahan
prospectively only.
"In 1916 Congress passed the Articles of War, which extended military jurisdiction to non-
capital civilian crimes committed in peacetime by servicemen. Duke & Vogel, supra note 7, at 451.
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bly as many as 450,000 petitions for restoration of rank, pay, or benefits
and as many as four thousand petitions for release from federal cus-
tody.20
Although Relford failed to solve the dilemma as to whether the
service-connection test is to be applied retroactively, the opinion ap-
peared to invite another case in which retroactivity would be "solely
dispositive. ' ' 21 However, while the Supreme Court awaits another case
to work its way through the military system, lower courts are faced with
immediate demands for retroactive application of O'Callahan.
The Court of Military Appeals, in Mercer v. Dillon,2 - held that
O'Callahan would not apply to cases finalized before June 21, 1969, the
date of the O'Callahan decision.Y The Mercer court refused to apply
O'Callahan retroactively for two reasons. First, it stated that
O'Callahan was not a jurisdictional decision at all but instead was con-
cerned only with the denial of the procedural due process rights to a jury
trial and a grand jury indictment. 2' The court's second ground was that
O'Callahan did not rule on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
of the military courts but rather limited the exercise of that jurisdiction
to crimes that are service-connected.2
The principle reason advanced for denying retroactive effect to
O'Callahan was that O'Callahan was concerned primarily with the de-
nial of the defendant's procedural guarantees and not with the jurisdic-
tion of a military court to try him. It was argued that the contention
that O'Callahan was grounded in jurisdiction is "merely playing with
words, and ignores both the rationale . . . and the realistic issue in the
case." 2 Thus the issue was said to be simply whether a new trial should
be given to those already tried. Under this argument the retroactivity
issue would be decided according to the criteria laid down by the Su-
preme Court when ruling on the retroactive effect of decisions which
granted procedural due process rights. Thus, the measure of "reliance
2Brief for Respondent at 28, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
21401 U.S. at 370.
-19 U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.M.R. 264 (1970).
'Two district courts have ruled that O'Callahan would be applied only prospectively. See
Thompson v. Parker, 308 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Gosa v. Mayden, 305 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D.
Fla. 1969). One court of appeals distinguished O'Callahan on its facts and on the authority of
Relford did not reach the retroactivity issue. Hemphill v. Moseley, 443 F.2d 322 (l0th Cir. 1971).
2419 U.S.C.M.A. at 264-68,41 C.M.R. at 264-68.
211d.
2Brief for Respondent at 31, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and the effect on
the administration of justice that the new standards"27 would likely have
led the Mercer court to deny retroactive effect to O'Callahan.
Evidently the Mercer court felt that in O'Callahan the Supreme
Court did not mean "jurisdiction" when it said "jurisdiction. 28 The
Mercer court stated that the O'Callahan Court had been concerned with
the "individual's particular rights in a trial rather than the power of the
court-martial to judge him. '29 To assess the validity of this argument it
is necessary to consider the nature and extent of military jurisdiction.
The military courts are largely creatures of statute. Thus, they
exercise only the limited jurisdiction granted by Congress pursuant to
its article I power" to establish rules for military courts.3 Prior to the
decision in O'Callahan, it was clear that the military had jurisdiction
to try any criminal case in which a serviceman was the defendant.
32
Moreover, the Supreme Court had not overruled the military court's
exercise of jurisdiction in this area. However, the O'Callahan decision
held that the military courts had not been granted the power to exercise
jurisdiction over servicemen for crimes not "service-connected." Much
of the O'Callahan opinion was devoted to a justification in terms of due
process of its holding, and thus it is not clear from the opinion that the
Court relied solely upon jurisdictional doctrine. O'Callahan asserted his
right to a civilian trial not because the military court failed to try him
by an impartial jury but because in this instance the military had no
jurisdiction to try him at all.3 3 Thus, while it may be true that the lack
"Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 266, 41 C.M.R. 264, 266. These tests are laid out in
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). See also DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
For the Supreme Court's rationale against retroactive application, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965).
21n at least one instance the Court has said "jurisdiction" when it did not mean "jurisdic-
tion." See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968). In Avco the Court
declared that its statement in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) that a
complaint was being dismissed "for lack of jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act" had
really been intended to mean "only that the Federal District Court lacked the general equity power
to grant the particular relief." 390 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
"19 U.S.C.M.A. at 272,41 C.M.R. at 272 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
3'See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 34 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
"See, e.g., Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583, 584 (1956); Swisher v. United States, 237 F.
Supp. 921,928 (W.D. Mo. 1965) affd, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966).
32W. AYCOCK & S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE 38-40 (1955).
3395 U.S. at 272.
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of procedural guarantees precipitated O'Callahan's claim, it was the
question of a lack of military jurisdiction that afforded the Court the
opportunity to grant relief. It therefore seems that the O'Callahan deci-
sion turned primarily on whether the defendant was subject to military
jurisdiction. That question being resolved negatively, it incidentally fol-
lowed that he was to be accorded the procedural guarantees of the
Constitution. Arguably, then, the criteria for determining the retroactiv-
ity of decisions according procedural rights should not apply to the
O'Callahan situation.
The Mercer court's second ground for denying retroactive effect to
O'Callahan was that "O'Callahan did not rule on the existence of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, [but rather] limited the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion . . . ."3 The Mercer majority found authority for this view in an
earlier decision by the Air Force Court of Military Review.3" That deci-
sion held that the military does have jurisdiction to try military members
for criminal misconduct sanctioned by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and that O'Callahan "merely withholds the exercise of jurisdic-
tion"36 over offenses that are not service-connected. However, after ex-
pressing this view of O'Callahan, the Court of Military Review
grounded its decision in the same procedural and administrative consid-
erations applied by the Supreme Court in its procedural due process
decisions. 37
O'Callahan neither suggested a difference between jurisdiction and
the exercise of jurisdiction nor spoke in terms of abstention by military
courts. If O'Callahan merely ordered the military courts to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction, by analogy to the present general rule respecting
abstention by federal courts to permit decision by state courts, the mili-
tary courts would be able to reassume and exercise their jurisdiction if
the non-military courts failed to act or acted outside the limits of the
Constitution. 3 However the language of O'Callahan clearly forbids any
exercise of military jurisdiction over non-service-connected crimes. The
Court laid down a mandate in terms of jurisdiction but justified and
u19 U.S.C.M.A. at 265, 41 C.M.R. at 265. See also United States v. King, 40 C.M.R. 1030,
1035 (1969).
-1United States v. King, 40 C.M.R. 1030 (1969).
uId. at 1035.
1id. at 1034-35.
UWRIGHT, § 52, at 198 & n.20. There are limited instances in which the federal courts have
been ordered to abstain completely and forfeit all original jurisdiction to state courts. Id. at 199.
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explained it in terms of procedural due process quarantees. This has
opened the possibility for the lower courts to latch onto one or the other
of these theories to determine the retroactivity issue. The legal and verbal
gymnastics of the Mercer court and the Air Force Board of Review
evidence concern in military circles regarding the overwhelming deluge
of collateral attacks against convictions that will result if O'Callahan is
applied retroactively.
The specific wording of the O'Callahan opinion adds some credence
to the belief that the decision was not jurisdictional and therefore should
be denied retroactive effect. The O'Callahan Court appeared to suggest
that the military system of justice is in need of procedural reform be-
cause it is "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitu-
tional law." 39 By focusing upon the procedural deficiencies "lurking in
military trials"4 instead of upon the military's lack of jurisdiction to
try O'Callahan, the Court did not unmistakably ground its decision in
jurisdiction.
There is some authority for the proposition that O'Callahan should
be applied retroactively. The dissent in Mercer felt that "[w]here juris-
diction is lacking there can be no question of prospective or retrospective
application, for where a court-martial proceeds without jurisdiction, its
action is null and void."'" The Mercer dissent concluded that the court
should be "concerned not with an individual's particular rights in a trial,
but the power of the court-martial to judge him. O'Callahan .. .
teaches clearly that such power is lacking .... -"2 A New York federal
district court in Flemings v. Chafee13 arguing from the same viewpoint,
added that it would observe the "traditional rule" and allow retroactive
effect unless specifically told not to do so by the Supreme Court.4
Both Flemings15 and the Mercer dissent46 expressed the belief that
the retroactivity issue was mooted by a prior determination of a lack of
jurisdiction. This view has been concurred in by the author of the Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1968, Senator Sam J. Ervin. Senator Ervin feels that
11395 U.S. at 265.
JGld.
"19 U.S.C.M.A. at 271, 41 C.M.R. at 271 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
121d. at 273, C.M.R. at 273.
43330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Id. at 197.
51d. at 199.
1119 U.S.C.M.A. at 272,41 C.M.R. at 272.
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the effect of O'Callahan was to decide that the military never had the
power to try a soldier's non-military crimes and that such convictions
are invalid.
47
When the dust of the battle of semantics settles, the ultimate deci-
sion to be made is whether the tremendous administrative burdens that
would be caused by retroactive application will outweigh the traditional
requirement that before the defendant can be legally convicted the court
must be one of competent jurisdiction. 8 The retroactivity question arose
because of the ambiguities of the O'Cllahan opinion. The question was
left unanswered by the Supreme Couft in Relford. The lower courts are
already in conflict on the question, and it will not be definitively an-
swered until the Supreme Court decides the retroactivity of
O'Callahan.49 It is vital that the Court do so and restore the certainty
of jurisdiction that is essential to all criminal justice.
LEE AUSTIN PATTERSON II
Torts-Negligence-The Substitute Birth Control Pill
By the turn of the 19th century Thomas Malthus and his disciples
were predicting dire consequences for a world rapidly proving too small
for its fertile population.1 These fears are ardently espoused in the 20th
century as well by zero population societies urgently crying, "make love
not babies-ban the population bomb."12 With the advent of sophisti-
cated and successful birth control techniques the ills of overpopulation
might someday be realistically avoided. Meanwhile, social mores are
undergoing change and the law is being challenged to keep pace by re-
examining traditional- concepts in light of these changes. One such con-
cept is the benefits-of-the-healthy-child rule, which proclaims that the
event of childbirth and the happiness of rearing a child always outweigh
the financial liability,3 Recently a Michigan Court of Appeals took issue
with this concept.
17See Note, Denial of Military Jurisdiction Over Servicemen's Crimes Having No Military
Significance and Cognizable in Civilian Courts, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 930, 938 (1970).
4 WRIGHT § 53, at 211.
"See 401 U.S. at 370.
1R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 58-84 (2d rev. ed. 1963).
'Friedrich, Population Explosion: Is Man Really Doomed?, TuNE, Sept. 13, 1971, at 58-59.
346 N.C.L. REv. 948, 949 (1968).
[Vol. 50
BIRTH CONTROL PILL
In Troppi v. Scare the defendant pharmacist negligently supplied
a tranquilizer, Nardil, instead of the oral contraceptive, Norinyl, called
for by prescription. As a result, Mrs. Troppi gave birth to her eighth
child. A negligence action to recover the mother's lost wages, medical
expenses, pain and suffering, and the cost of rearing another child was
dismissed at the trial level for failure to state a cause of action for which
relief could be granted. In short, the benefits of an unplanned, healthy
child precluded any recovery whatsoever as a matter of law. On appeal,
recognizing the highly controversial nature of contraception and child-
birth, the court concentrated on the extent to which the defendant might
be civilly liable for the consequences of his negligence.5 The court decided
to adopt a flexible benefits rule, one operating on a case-by-case basis
that would allow the trier of fact to balance the benefits of a healthy
child against all elements of damage, with special consideration for the
plaintiff's particular circumstances. 6
Since chemical birth control is relatively new, it is not surprising
that Troppi is the first reported decision by a court of review that in-
volves consideration of the ticklish issues in this area. However, similar
situations have arisen in the field of sterilization. The first sterilization
case, Christensen v. Thornby 7 was brought on grounds of deceit. The
court ignored the obvious sterilization purpose of the vasectomy and
focused on the plaintiffs stated intention of protecting his wife's health.
Since a normal delivery occurred, the court reasoned that without im-
pairment of the wife's health there would be no recovery.8 Similarly, a
Pennsylvania decision, Shaheen v. Knight,9 was an action for breach of
contract based on a written guarantee of sterility by vasectomy which
failed. The plaintiff sued for the additional expenses of rearing his fifth
child, who was conceived after the operation. The court decreed a classic
statement of the rigid benefits rule that "to allow damages for the
normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal public senti-
ment of the people." I
131 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
51d. at_ 187 N.W.2d at 513.
1d. at __ 187 N.W.2d at 518-19.
7192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
Vd. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
911 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County C.P. 1957).
"0Id. at 45. For an excellent discussion of the sterilization cases which favors recovery based
on medical malpractice and the punitive nature of torts see Note, Sterilization and Family Planning:
The Physician's Civil Liability, 56 GEo. L.J. 976 (1968).
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Significantly, in 1967 a California court reviewed the history of
sterilization cases in a landmark decision, Custodio v. Bauer," and con-
cluded that even if a normal baby were born, the plaintiffs were entitled
to more than nominal damages if the physician negligently performed
the sterilization. 2 In yet another negligent sterilization case, Coleman v.
Garrison,'3 a Delaware court extended this reasoning to allow the jury
to weigh the benefits against the economic burden, including the expen-
ses of rearing and educating the unwanted child.' 4
These latter two cases concentrated on the legalistic concept of a
negligent tortfeasor who has, at least monetarily, injured the plaintiffs.
This element of negligence is also the basis for the Troppi decision.
Unlike the earlier sterilization cases, Troppi was not founded upon
breach of warranty or deceit. There was no allegation that the birth
control pills were defective, the products liability situation; nor was this
the case of the pharmacist who plays "God," doling out or withholding
contraceptives at his capricious whim. Nor was the concept of wrongful
life-the illegitimate or retarded child asserting as a cause of action that
he should not have been born-applicable here." The plaintiffs in the
guaranteed-sterilization cases consider the mere birth of a child a breach
of contract. Mr. and Mrs. Troppi were seeking compensation not for
the birth of a healthy baby but for the tangible monetary expenses
incurred as a result of the birth. The child was not merely unwanted or
unplanned in the sense that it was, as millions of children were, conceived
without due deliberation by the prospective parents; here the parents
deliberately planned not to have any more children.
In every negligence action certain elements must be proven, and the
Troppi fact situation provided no exception. First, the plaintiff must
establish a certain duty, or standard of care, owed him by the defen-
dant. 7 Because of the responsible role of the pharmacist in society and
the great potential for harm inherent in drugs, a high standard of care
has been legally established:
"251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
2251 Cal. App. 2d at _ 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
13281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
"Id. at 618.
1531 Mich. App. at -. n.I, 187 N.W.2d at 513 n.l.
"For a discussion of the wrongful life doctrine and its limited bearing on the sterilization cases
see Note, Damages-The Not So Blessed "Blessed Event," 46 N.C.L. REV. 948, 953-56 (1968).7W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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In a business so hazardous, having to do so directly and frequently with
the health and lives of so great a number of people, the highest degree
of care and prudence for the safety of those dealing with such dealer is
required.' 8
Next, the plaintiff has to show a specific act of negligence by the
defendant or his agent. 9 In Troppi the pharmacist, when receiving the.
doctor's instructions by telephone, Wrote the wrong drug name into the
prescription and gave Mrs. Troppi tranquilizers instead of birth control
pills.2o When complex chemical compounds are identified by brand
names or shortened root words, the competent pharmacist should repeat
the prescription to the physician to avoid unprofessional errors.2'
Third, the plaintiff must show cause-in-fact, that but for the phar-
macist's mistake the injury would not have occurred.22 The court in
Troppi assumed that the defendant's negligence was a cause in fact in
order to consider the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. 3 To com-
plete the proof of negligence proximate cause must also be shown,24 but
the probability of preganancy following the substitution of tranquilizers
for birth control pills easily satisfied the foreseeability requirement.2
In order to recover damages in a negligence action, the plaintiff
must show some injury to person or property. 26 The award of damages
for a healthy baby born by normal delivery is clearly the significant issue
in Troppi. Laying aside temporarily the intangible benefits of parent-
"Smith's Adm'x v. Middleton, 112 Ky. 588, 594-95, 66 S.W. 388, 389 (1902). See also 28
C.J.S. Druggists § 6 (1941). In North Carolina the pharmacist is held to the same meticulous
standard of care. See Spry v. Kiser, 179 N.C. 417,422, 102 S.E. 708, 710-11 (1920).
"PRossER § 30, at 143 & § 56, at 338-39.
"The Raleigh News and Observer, Nov. 15, 1971, at 25, col. 1.
2 For example, in Troppi the birth control pill "Norinyl" is norethindrone mestranol, and the
similar sounding tranquilizer "Nardil" is phenelzine. MEDICAL ECONOMICS, INC., PHYSICIANS'
DESK REFERENCE 1138, 1202 (1968).
2PRoSSER § 41, at 236.
2131 Mich. App. at - 187 N.W.2d at 513.
UPROSSER § 42, at 244.
1The cause-in-fact and proximate cause issues are much more complex if the woman has been
taking birth control pills for some time and only one substitute pill or pills for one menstrual cycle
were negligently supplied. The evidence must show at what exact point in the woman's menstrual
period the pills were taken. Also, if the woman knows or should know how her pills look and the
substituted drug is radically different in appearance, the issue of contributory negligence may be
raised. A brief illuminating discussion of how birth control pills work and of the difficult issues of
proof can be found in Sheppard, Negligent Interference With Birth Control Practices, 11 S. TEx.
L.J. 229, 252-54 (1969).
"PROSER § 30, at 143.
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hood, one can assess the plaintiff's precise measurable damages-the
medical and hospital bills and mother's loss of wages. Pain and suffer-
ing, although not as easy to evaluate accurately, are a commonplace
element of damages for the trier of fact .2 The economic costs of rearing
an eighth child are measurable much the same as child support in a
divorce action.
28
Replying to this assessment of damages, the defendant cited
Restatement of Torts section 920:
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the
plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value




The defendant contends that under section 920 and the benefits rule,
whenever a healthy child is born the joys, blessings, companionship, and
love of rearing the child always outweigh any possible recovery as a
matter of law. The basic flaw in this argument was pointed out by a
Florida court which held in Jackson v. Anderson" that normal birth
mitigates damages and does not vitiate liability. Therefore, the negligent
defendant may still be liable for damages if in the particular case the
benefits of the unwanted child are not greater than the expenses of
rearing him. Under the more flexible benefits rule adopted in the Troppi
decision, the trier of fact must have the power to decide each case in light
of such factors as family size, fixed income, marital status, parental age
and health, and so on.3' Of course, the task of balancing the intangible
2731 Mich. App. at - 187 N.W.2d at 5"13. Since childbirth is such a frequent occurrence,
the pain and suffering of pregnancy and giving birth are reasonably within the common experience
of many women. In the United States, 24.5 women per 1,000 die during childbirth, a further
indication of the expectant mother's anxiety during pregnancy. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 55 (92d ed.).
2An example of this computation of the cost of a child is Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48,
56-59, 134 S.E.2d 227, 233-35 (1964).
21RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939). One legal writer, citing the equitable nature of this
section and the differences between the injury and the nature of the benefit (e.g., balancing the loss
of the wife's services against the benefits of parenthood), describes section 920 as particularly
inappropriate. Sheppard, supra note 25, at 238-42.
3230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
1131 Mich. App. at - 187 N.W.2d at 518-19. The court distinguishes the situation of the
unmarried coed, to whom the unwanted child would be a burden and a financial millstone, from
that of the couple who only wanted to delay conception for an extended honeymoon. A pharamcist's
negligence may cost the struggling coed an education and a career. The argument that every plaintiff
[Vol. 50
BIRTH CONTROL PILL
blessings of a child against the expenses of rearing him seems difficult
and uncertain, but in wrongful death cases juries are normally called
upon to do just that.
32
Perhaps the most appealing argument in the defendant-
pharmacist's favor is that, no matter how negligent he was, to force the
defendant to pay damages while the parents enjoy the happiness and
blessings of rearing a healthy child is against public policy. One legal
writer has concluded that to allow recovery for a normal birth would
be ethically repugnant to the family unit system and would later prove
emotionally traumatic to the unwanted child.Y
A classic statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clearly set
out the limitations of the judicial power to formulate public policy:
The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with
public policy does not extend to specific economic or social problems
which are controversial in nature and capable of solution only as the
result of a study of various factors and conditions. It is only when a
given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety,
morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard
to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in
so declaring. 34
Contraception, sterilization, and the population explosion are volatile
issues with religious and moralistic arguments on both sides. Such con-
troversial issues do not lend themselves to sweeping pronouncements Qf
public policy or "unanimity of opinion."
On the other hand, couples seeking to limit the size of their family
have laudable aims; for instance, the husband's income may only be
adequate to reasonably support, clothe, feed, and house a certain num-
should put up the unwanted child for adoption ignores the bonds of affection and obligation formed
by childbirth and asks the court to foster a rule which would separate the child from its natural
parents.
"Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 194 (1946).
3-9 UTAH L. Rav. 808, 815 (1965). But see Sheppard, supra note 25, at 244-46. The emotional
trauma suffered by a child who discovers that he was once involved in a lawsuit to lessen his
economic burden is certainly less than that experienced by the child whose parents put him up for
adoption. Every parent who has used birth control pills or has been sterilized or has had an abortion
has not wanted children for some reason. The alternative of no recovery whatsoever could only
increase, not lessen, the child's "unwantedness."
mMamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A.2d 407,409 (1941).
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ber of children. 35 The couple may have allotted funds for their children's
higher education. The nev unwanted addition requires a reallottment of
family resources to the detriment of the other children. Also, a great
disparity in ages between the new arrial and his closest sibling can
disrupt the family's life style. The California court in Custodio v.
Bauer" noted that the mother must now "spread her society, comfort,
care, protection and support over a larger group"3 7 and that recovery is
not so much for the unwanted child but "to replenish the family exche-
quer."' 38 Any recovery will inure to the benefit of the family and thus
offset the burdens of the unwanted child.
Moreover, the Michigan court in Troppi cited state statutes pro-
moting the use of family planning services" and concluded that "[w]here
the State's advocacy of family planning is so vigorous as to include
payments for contraceptives as part of the welfare program, public pol-
icy cannot be said to disfavor contraception." 40 Also, the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare has vigorously advocated family
planning in several publications.4' The United States Supreme Court has
held that the practice of contraception falls within the constitutionally
protected "zone of privacy" inherent in the marital relationship."
Today when 8.5 million women use birth control pills specifically to
avoid conception,4 3 the overriding benefits of parenthood claimed by
defendant seem exaggerated. Also, defendant's position overlooks the
punitive nature of torts. Theoretically at least, allowing the suit would
encourage pharmacists to exercise a greater degree of care.
Therefore, the Troppi decision contributes laudably to the merger
of judicial and social standards. The defendant by his own act of negli-
gence created a situation, wholly within the foreseeable realm of conse-
31In North Carolina the father has a legal obligation to give his child the advantages as well
as the necessities of life commensurate with his financial circumstances and position. Williams v.
Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 57, 134 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1964).
3251 Cal. App. 2d'303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
3Id. at . 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
31ld. at - 59 Cal. Rptr.at 477.
3
'MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 14.7[l] (1969) concerns a family planning service for "medi-
cally indigent" women; MICH. CoIP. LAws ANN. § 16.41412] (Supp. 1971) authorizes the provi-
sion of contraceptives for the indigent through the state Department of Social Welfare.
4031 Mich. App. at - 187 N.W.2d at 517.
"1See, e.g., HEW, FAMILY PLANNING: ONE LOCAL PUBLIC VELFARE AGENCY'S APPROACH
(1966); HEW, REPORT ON FAMILY PLANNING (1966).
"2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
'OPOPULATION BULLETIN, Dec., 1970, at 21-22.
416 [Vol. 50
PROOF OF DEFECT
quences, whereby the plaintiffs financial resources were decreased and
his costs of living were increased. Other lesser courts have moved in the
same direction. For instance, on very similar facts when dehydrating
pills were negligently substituted for birth control pills, a Washington
superior court allowed the jury to consider the mother's medical expen-
ses and the aggravation of a pre-existing varicose veins condition." How-
ever, the court refused to consider the pain and suffering of a normal
pregnancy as compensable. Also, a recent decision in Los Angeles
County Superior Court concerning the substitution of sleeping pills for
birth control pills by the negligent pharmacist resulted in a 42,000 dollar
recovery for the parents.
45
As the number of women who use chemical contraceptives in-
creases, more courts will be faced with reconsidering the strict benefits
rule. The flexible rule of Troppi-allowing the jury to weigh all of the
claimed benefits against the economic burdens of an unwanted child in
each case-is the better reasoned approach in reconciling traditional
concepts of tort liability and the changing ethos of the American family.
Decisions like Troppi provide the courts with an opportunity to narrow
the gap between dated judicial standards and modern sociological
trends.
THOMAS JOSEPH FARRIS
Torts-Product Liability-Circumstantial Evidence and 'Proof of Defect
Since the landmark decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,' the doctrine of strict liability in tort as a protection for consumers
injured by a defective product has met with wide acceptance. 2 The courts
have re-examined their traditional rationale for product liability and
have decided that the consumer is entitled to maximum protection at the
expense of those who market the products.3 Relying on this premise,
"Coloff v. Hi Ho Shopping Center, No. 168070 (Wash. Super. Ct. Pierce County), cited in
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, - n._ 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 471 n. 10 (1967).
1lThe Charlotte Observer, Nov. 26, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 1.
'32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
2Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 325 (Alas. 1970). In W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 98,
at 657-58 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER], Dean Prosser states that two-thirds of the
courts in the United States have accepted the doctrine of strict products liability.
3RESTATENENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 350 (1964).
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many courts have abandoned a negligence analysis and have imposed
liability without fault on those who place a defective product in the
hands of a consumer who is injured because of the defect.'
The doctrine of strict liability for a seller of a defective product is
set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A 5 as follows:
(1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product. and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) This rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
Pennsylvania has adopted section 402A,1 and in a recent case,
McCann v. Atlas Supply Co..' a United States District Court sitting in
that state imposed strict liability upon a distributor of automobile tires.
In anticipation of a vacation trip, the plaintiff had purchased two new
tires from the defendant distributor and at the time of the accident had
driven on them less than two thousand miles.8 The plaintiff was pulling
a trailer at a speed of fifty to fifty-five miles per hour when he heard a
hissing sound like "air escaping." The car fishtailed, the trailer jack-
nifed, and the car overturned. The plaintiff jumped from his car and
noticed that the left rear tire of the automobile was badly mutilated and
was smoking. Shortly thereafter the tire burst into flames; the fire de-
stroyed the tire and, after spreading, severely damaged the car and its
contents.' At the trial the plaintiff testified that before the fire had
started, he had heard a hissing sound from butane storage tanks on the
trailer and had immediately turned them off.'0 He did not believe that
4Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
5
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
6Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).






enough gas had escaped to cause the fire. The testimony disclosed noth-
ing unusual that might have caused damage to the tire. The trip was on
paved roads, the trailer was handled properly, and the brakes were oper-
ated in approved fashion.
The plaintiff sought recovery under section 402A, contending that
the sudden loss of air from the tire was a malfunction of the product
and thus evidence of a defect. Because the tire was totally destroyed, the
plaintiff relied solely on circumstantial evidence to meet the proof-of-
defect requirement of section 402A.
The court, sitting without a jury, found for the plaintiff. It based
its decision on a number of Pennsylvania cases which had held that the
occurrence of a malfunction alone may be circumstantial evidence of a
defect and hence, under section 402A, sufficient to carry the case to a
jury. The defendant argued that the tire could have been damaged as a
result of striking objects in the road. The court admitted this possibility
but stated that the plaintiff was not required to exclude every possible
source of sudden deflation other than a defect in the tire itself.,'
The plaintiff in McCann relied upon circumstantial evidence just as
plaintiffs have usually done to prove fault in negligence cases.1 2 Negli-
gence like any other fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 13 In
a negligence action against a manufacturer or distributor of a defective
product, direct evidence of negligence will often be absent because the
plaintiff lacks access to the manufacturing or inspection processes. In
such a case the plaintiff must use circumstantial evidence to raise the
inference of the defendant's lack of due care and to prove various ingre-
dients of his prima facie case. 14 The plaintiff may also depend upon
circumstantial evidence to prove proximate cause, 5 freedom from con-
1Ild.
12Ewer v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 4 Wash. App. 152, 156, 480 P.2d 260, 264 (1971);
PROSSER § 39, at 212.
3Forrester v. Fischbach-Moore, Inc., 178 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1970); Consalvo v. Grosso, 35
App. Div. 2d 791, 315 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1970). PROSSER § 39, at 212 states, "Circumstantial evid-
ence consists of one fact, or set of facts, from which the fact to be determined may reasonably be
inferred. It involves ... a process of reasoning, or inference, by which a conclusion is drawn."
Examples of a plaintiff's circumstantial evidence are the physical results of an automobile collision
to raise the inference that the defendant was negligent and the fact that defendant's train passed
moments before a prairie fire broke out to raise the inference that defendant's train started the fire.
St. Joseph's Bank & Trust Co. v. Putman, - Ind. App. - 252 N.E.2d 601 (1969); St. Louis
& S.F.R.R. v. Shannon, 25 Okla. 754, 108 P.401 (1910).
"Consalvo v. Grosso, 35 App. Div. 2d 791, 315 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1970); Carson v. Squirrel Inn
Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.C. 1969).
15Papac v. Mays Bros. Logging Co., I Wash. App. 33, 459 P.2d 57 (1969).
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tributory negligence.' 6 and other important facts of the case. 7
Though under section 402A a plaintiff does not have to prove negli-
gence, he must still prove that the manufacturer, seller, or distributor
placed a defective product in his hands and that he was injured by that
product.' When direct proof is lacking,"0 the plaintiff must rely upon
circumstantial evidence to prove the existence of a defect in the product."0
During the fairly short life of strict product liability,2' plaintiffs have
established distinct patterns in their use of circumstantial evidence to
prove their prima facie case of a defective product. There have emerged
from the cases five distinct categories of circumstantial evidence that.
used in combination with each other or in combination with direct evid-
ence, can raise the necessary inferences required by section 402A to get
the plaintiff to the jury.
The First of these types of evidence is expert opinion that the product
was defective. Such an opinion may raise an inference that a product was
defective despite the absence of any direct proof of a specific defect.22 In
Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,2 3 the plaintiff introduced no direct
evidence of a defective drive shaft on an American Motors automobile
but relied instead on the opinion of an expert who had examined the
automobile and who testified that the cause of the drive shaft's falling
was "either loose fastenings or metal failure and [was not] anything the
driver did or normal wear and tear."24 The court felt that this opinion
'8id.
"7 Moore v. State, 186 Neb. 67, 180 N.W.2d 917 (1970) (knowledge of accident); St. Louis &
S.F.R.R. v. Shannon. 25 Okla. 754, 108 P. 40 (1910) (origin of fire); Franks v. J.C. Penney Co..
133 Cal. App. 2d 123, 283 P.2d 291 (1955) (length of time dangerous condition existed).
sMagnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 44, 171 N.W.2d 201, 209 (1969); Forry v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 428 Pa. 334. 340, 237 A.2d 593, 597 (1968); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer). 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 840 (1966).
"9See PROSSER § 96, at 671 (3rd ed. 1964).
"Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., - Ill. App. - 265 N.E.2d 212 (1971) (difficult to
determine if damage to steering mechanism existed before accident); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors. Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (damage to car so great impossible to determine if
parts defective). These cases and McCann illustrate a frequent problem in products liability cases.
Often, the product is so damaged by the accident that direct evidence of a defect through examina-
tion of the product is impossible to produce. This is analagous to the problem of proving a
manufacturer's negligence because the plaintiff rarely has access to the manufacturing process to
obtain direct evidence.
21Henningsen was decided in 1960.
"EImore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969);
Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co.. - Ill. App. - 265 N.E.2d 212 (1970).
2170 Cal. 2d 578,451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
211d. at 582,451 P.2d at 86, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
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was sufficient to raise the inference that a defect existed prior to the sale
of the automobile to the plaintiff.25
The plaintiff may also raise the inference of a defect in a product
by an expert's answer to a hypothetical question. In Bollmeier v. Ford
Motor Co.2" the court stated "it is well established that an expert, if
qualified, may give an opinion based on a hypothetical question and
without personal knowledge of the facts . . . and that his opinion is a
matter of credibility for the jury and may be rebutted by defendant's
proof.""7 It has also been held that an expert's testimony as to the
existence of a defect does not have to be completely positive or unequivo-
cal in order to support a jury finding of the defect.2"
A second category of circumstantial evidence by which a plaintiff
may prove the existence of a defect is the past history of the product. A
plaintiff will frequently rely upon evidence that prior to the event in issue
the product in question had shown signs of a defective condition.2 9 In
Bollineier, the plaintiffs, in attempting to prove a defect in the steering
wheel of the car, testified that from the day the car was delivered they
had observed a "vibration which could be seen and felt in the steering
column and the steering wheel" 30 and that they had returned the car to
the dealer several times to have the irregularity corrected. The court sent
the case to the jury on circumstantial evidence of past irregularities
which, coupled with the occurrence of the accident, raised the inference
that the steering column was defective when it left the manufacturer.
It should be noted that the past history of a product may support
an inference not only that the product was defective when the event that
caused the plaintiff's injury occurred but also that the product was
defective when it left the manufacturer. If the product involved was
received by the consumer in a sealed container, a trier of fact may infer
that the product reached the consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it was sold.' However, the history of a product may
also destroy an inference that there had been no substantial change in
21See Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., -Ore. - _ 473 P.2d 862, 863 (1970).
2.. 111. App. - 265 N.E.2d 212 (1970).
271d. at - 265 N.E.2d at 215.
Z'Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1970); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co.,
214 Pa. Super. 2d 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
2 Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d ,1182 (3d Cir. 1970); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co.,
214 Pa. Super. 2d 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
1. III. App. at - 265 N.E.2d at 215.
"Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969) (dictum).
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the product since it left the manufacturer. In Sundet v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp.,32 for example, the court held that a product liability
action was properly dismissed when a cartridge that had exploded came
from an unsealed box that contained earmarks of reloaded casings.
There was no evidence that the defendant was engaged in the business
of reloading casings, and the court therefore felt that the jury could not
without additional evidence reasonably infer that the cartridge was
defective when it left the defendant's plant.
33
A third type of circumstantial evidence used to prove a defect in-
volves evidence concerning the circumstances of the accident itself. Even
though this testimony does not pinpoint the specific defect, the descrip-
tion of events surrounding an accident which involves a product may
raise the inference of a defect.3 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, 35 in reversing a verdict against a plaintiff who had been injured
when the defendant manufacturer's bottles exploded, said, "Both plain-
tiff and Leon Dorsey testified that the bottle exploded spontaneously.
Their testimony alone, given the fact that an explosion was not a physi-
cal impossibility, was sufficient to make the issue a jury question. ' 3 In
Henningsen the plaintiff had been injured when her automobile suddenly
veered off the road. She alleged that the steering mechanism was defec-
tive and that the defendant retailer was therefore liable for injuries
caused by the defect. The plaintiff testified that she had heard a loud
noise "from the bottom, by the hood." She stated that it had "felt as if
something cracked" and the steering wheel had spun in her hands as the
car veered off the road.3 7 The plaintiff's description of the automobile
accident coupled with, expert testimony was considered sufficient to
make out a prima facie case.
Another type of circumstantial evidence used to raise the inference
of a defect is evidence that negates possible causes of the accident aside
2179 Neb. 587, 139 N.W.2d 368 (1966).
31d. at 588, 139 N.W.2d at 369.
mHenningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). For a caustic
criticism of the use of this type of circumstantial evidence in Henningsen, see Freedman, "Defect"
in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TNN. L.
Rav. 323, 326 (1966).
'Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d 231 (1968).
UsId. at 184-85, 242 A.2d at 235; accord, Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., -Minn.
, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971).
132 N.J. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75.
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from the existence of a defect .3 However, courts vary in their opinions
as to what kinds of circumstantial evidence are required to exclude other
causes, and thus the importance of evidence of this type varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 9 In addition, the amount of evidence re-
quired to negate other causes will often depend on the type of accident
which occurred. For example, in Franks v. National Dairy Products
Corp.," the court stated that "'[w]hen circumstantial evidence is the
only proof, courts have infrequently inferred negligence (here a defect)
simply from the accident and proof of careful conduct by the plaintiff,
and then only in instances where the accident is the type which, standing
alone, points an accusing finger at the maker.' "41 In Franks the sponta-
neous explosion of a can of margarine had injured the plaintiff. The
plaintiff proved the accident and introduced expert testimony to the
effect that there were only three possible causes of the explosion other,
than a defect. Plaintiff then introduced evidence that negated the other
three causes and thus raised the inference of the existence of a defect.
4 2
A fifth type of circumstantial evidence which plaintiffs use to prove
a defect is the occurrence of the accident itself. The fact that an accident
occurred will always be part of plaintiff's case and will usually be joined
with at least one of the foregoing types of circumstantial evidence or, if
possible, with direct evidence. Some jurisdictions, however, have flatly
stated that evidence only of the occurrence of an accident in connection
with the use of a product will never support an inference of the existence
of a defect. However, in McCann and other cases the Pennsylvania
courts have held that in some situations such evidence alone may raise
the inference of a defect.44 The court in McCann stated, "A number of
31Such evidence is often used in conjunction with other types of circumstantial evidence. Rhein-
gold, Proof of Defect in Products Liability Cases, 76 CASE & COM. 20, 25, (1971).
"See, e.g., Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969) (plaintiff need not
"rebut by direct evidence all of the conceivable possibilities"); O'Hara v. General Motors Corp.,
35 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1940) (plaintiff must negative "other possible causes of the
accident"); Taylor v. Carborundum Co., 107 Ill. App. 2d 12, 19-20, 246 N.E.2d 898, 902 (1969)
("plaintiff . . .is not required . . . to disprove every theory supporting a cause of failure other
than the one he alleged").
11282 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Tex. 1968).
111d. at 531, quoting Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 854 (5th Cir. 1968).
'11d. The court felt that it was essential in proving a defect when the product is in the hands of
the consumer that the plaintiff negative other possible causes.
"Franks v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Tex. 1968); Vandercook &
Son, Inc., v. Thorpe, 322 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1963); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d
841 (5th Cir. 1967); see Freedman, supra note 34 at 324.
"E.g., Greco v. Buccioni Eng'r Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
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Pennsylvania cases hold that the occurrence of a malfunction may be
circumstantial evidence of a defect in a product and hence sufficient to
carry the case to a jury on plaintiff's contention that a manufacturer is
liable under section 402A.
' 45
The types and problems of proof are essentially the same in both
strict and negligent product liability cases. The quantum of evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, necessary to sustain a plaintiffs bur-
den of proof in both is also essentially the same: there must be evidence
from which reasonable men could conclude that more likely than not the
fact to be determined is true. 6 These similarities raise the question of
whether an injured plaintiff has benefited from the adoption of section
402A. The plaintiff in McCann could as easily have recovered against
the manufacturer in a negligence action. Once the plaintiff proved that
the product was defective when it left the manufacturer, the inference
could be drawn under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that the defect
was due to the manufacturer's negligence. 7 However, McCann brought
his action against a distributor, and in a negligence action it is doubtful
that negligence on the part of distributor could be inferred from the
defective product.4 1 Without evidence of a specific defect that could have
been detected by the distributor no inference can be drawn that the
distributor was negligent.
In a negligence action against a distributor, a plaintiff must have
more than circumstantial evidence of a defective product to raise the
inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff must prove
not only that the product was defective but also that the distributor was
negligent in passing the product to the consumer. Under section 402A a
plaintiff need not prove fault and therefore can rely solely upon circum-
stantial evidence to raise inference of a defect and get his case to the jury.
Therefore, a consumer who brings a strict liability action against a
41325 F. Supp. at 703.
6PROSSER § 103, at 673.
4
7PROSSER § 39, at 214 lists the following conditions as necessary for the application of res
ipsa loquitur:
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence; (2) it must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "'Defect" in the Manufacture and Design
of Products, 20 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 559, 563 (1969).
48PRossER § 103, at 672 n.3.
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distributor of a defective product has an easier burden of proof than one
who must sue in negligence. One of the main objectives of section 402A
is to provide increased protection for consumers who are injured by
defective products. 9 By basing liability on proof of defect and thus
making recovery against a distributor of a defective product much more
likely than in a negligence action, section 402A has given the consumer
increased protection.
CHARLES H. CRANFORD
Torts-Rejection of the Voluntariness Test in Assumption of Risk
The doctrine of assumption of risk in the law of negligence, while
still relatively quite young,1 has for some time been roundly condemned
by courts 2 and commentators 3 alike as a judicially created device afford-
ing legal insulation to defendants who have concededly breached their
duty toward injured plaintiffs. Dissatisfaction with the doctrine has led
some jurisdictions tor restrict severely the application of assumption of
risk and in some areas to wipe it out altogether.4 As a result of Hoar v.
Sherburne Corp. ,5 it is arguable that as a practical matter assumption
of risk is no longer-available as a separate defense to a landowner in a
negligence action in Vermont.
In Hoar, plaintiff sustained injuries while crossing an access road
cutting through property which defendant owned and maintained as a
ski resort. At the time of the mishap, plaintiff was returning from defen-
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 350 (1964).
'Assumption of risk does not appear to have been recognized as a separate defense to a
negligence action before the turn of the nineteenth century. Prosser indicates that Cruden v. Fen-
tham, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (K.B. 1799), is probably the first distinguishable case. W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 68 n.9 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent to which
uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its
felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula,
undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.. 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter concludes that the phrase "assumption of risk" should be discarded. Id. at 72. See
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 96 (1959); cases cited in
James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 187 n. 11 (1968).
'See, e.g.. James, supra note 2; Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of
Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5 (1961).
'See text accompanying note 28 infra.
1327 F. Supp. 570 (D. Vt. 1971).
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dant's ski shop where she had gone for the purpose of buying some
"warm-up" pants and on the way to which a sudden snow storm had
developed. On the return trip, plaintiff slipped and fell on the path
leading across the access road, although she had been looking where she
was going and had seen the unsanded ice beneath her feet. At least fifteen
minutes had passed from the time the snow storm began to the time of
the accident. On these facts, the jury was allowed to find that plaintiff
was a business visitor of defendant, that she had carefully conducted
herself while walking on an unsafe pathway that was subject to the
control of defendant, and that she was entitled to recover damages for
the injuries that she had suffered.
Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, con-
tending inter alia that plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter of law.
The court denied the motion and in doing so sharply restricted the
doctrine of assumption of risk itself, thereby going further than even
those recent decisions in other jurisdictions that have extended the duty
owed to others by certain owners and occupiers of land. 6 In order to
present the court's decision in its proper perspective, and with due cred-
ence to the complex issues involved, it will first be necessary to summa-
rize briefly the background of the law in this area.
Assumption of risk as a defense in negligence actions originated in
the reluctance of the common law courts to impose burdensome restric-
tions on expanding industry by way of untrammelled liability during the
Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century. 7 During these early
stages the defense was designed to allow an admittedly negligent em-
ployer to escape liability through the use of a pure fiction that held the
plaintiff to have "assumed" all risks arising out of the master-servant
relationship. Later, this rigid rule was relaxed somewhat, and the em-
ployee was held to have assumed only those risks of which he was aware
or which were so patent that reasonable men could not differ as to their
existence.8 But in the meantime the rationale of assumption of risk in
6See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
7See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943). This position had
achieved popular and judicial acceptance in response to Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex.
1837), a landmark case from which assumption of risk received its greatest impetus. PROSSER § 68
n.9.
8See, e.g., Focht v. Johnson, 51 Wash. 2d 47, 315 P.2d 633 (1957). This case was overruled in
Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 60-Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962), which explicitly held that
assumption of risk would no longer be recognized as a defense to an employer inia negligence action.
See text accompanying notes 28-29 infra.
[Vol. 50
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
this context had come to be applied to other interpersonal relationships
as well, until finally it had become quite thoroughly merged with the law
of negligence in general. Ironically, the policy considerations that gave
rise to the doctrine in the master-servent area-maximum freedom to
expanding industry-steadily subsided with the establishment of indus-
try as a burgeoning stronghold in this country, with the result that we
have been left to struggle with a legal defense mechanism whose very
raison d'etre has now been expressly rejected, as will be seen,9 by a
substantial number of jurisdictions.
As applied today, assumption of risk is subject to so much confu-
sion that not a few learned legal scholars have advocated its abolition.'0
By means of the defense a.defeiidant is effectively insulated from liability
potentially arising from his own* negligence if he establishes that the
plaintiff voluntarily chose to encounter the known risk created by the
defendant's negligence. Thus, there are two primary ingredients of the
defense, which the defendant has the burden of proving" by a greater
weight of the evidence: first, the plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation
of the risk created by the defendant, and second, the plaintiff's voluntary
decision to encounter this risk despite such knowledge. 2 If the plaintiff,
with full knowledge and appreciation of all the facts and with no com-
pulsion whatsoever to do so, makes an entirely free and voluntary deci-
sion to incur the risk anyway, he is barred on grounds of assumption of
risk from recovering for consequential injuries. The same idea is often
expressed in the alternative by saying that the decision is not a free and
voluntary one when the advantages to be gained by the plaintiff's meet-
ing the risk outweigh the relative disadvantages thereof'3 or when the
defendant has not afforded the plaintiff a reasonably safe alternative
choice of action. 4 In either event, it is presumed that the plaintiff has
9See text accompanying note 29 infra.
'"See, e.g., James, supra note 2; Wade, supra note 3.
"See note 23 infra.
"PROSSER § 68, at 447.
"Id. at 440.
"Id. at 451. It should be noted that these alternative expressions of the voluntariness require-
ment involve two clearly distinguishable concepts. Firstly, the term "voluntary" can be applied to
behavior directed to the end which the plaintiff contemplates in choosing whether or not to encoun-
ter an unreasonable risk created by the defendant. Attainment of the objectives sought by the
plaintiff may be, on balance, so socially important as to compel on policy grounds a holding that
the plaintiff's ultimate decision to encounter the risk cannot be legally voluntary. In the converse
situation, when the plaintiff's goal is not so vital, the doctrine of assumption of risk may be applied
to deny recovery-in other words, the advantages to be gained from meeting a known risk are held
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actual knowledge of the negligently created risk. 5
Assumption of risk is also generally extended to cover situations in
which the plaintiff has expressly consented to take his chances with the
risk 6 or in which such consent may safely be implied." In such cases,
however, a lack of duty on the part of the defendant is the basis for a
denial of recovery, and the issue of negligence is never reached at all. Still
other courts appear to confuse the distinctions between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence', by applying either or both to situa-
tions in which the plaintiff unreasonably encounters or negligently fails
to discover the risk. The net chaos has led some writers to suggest that
to be outweighed by their corresponding disadvantages. The Hoar court rejected this dichotomy in
holding that the possible lack of social desirability of the plaintiff's objectives should not limit the
defendant's liability. 327 F. Supp. at 577-78.
Secondly, the term "voluntary" can with equal validity be applied to behavior directed to the
means by which the plaintiff in fact encounters the unreasonable risk. Courts frequently deny
recovery under the guise of assumption of risk because in "voluntarily" choosing to encounter the
risk, the plaintiff declined to exploit reasonably safe and convenient alternative means, of which he
was aware, of attaining the same objective that was contemplated. In Hoar a reasonable alternative
route was not available to plaintiff. Id. at 571. Thus it might be argued that Hoar rejected the
voluntariness test only to the extent that voluntariness is used in the sense of "social utility" to the
plaintiff, and that consequently the impact of this case is greatly diluted. Arguably, however.
voluntariness" and the doctrine of assumption of risk are irrelevant as regards the plaintiff's choice
between alternatives, because in this context the issue of the defendant's liability is perfectly amena-
ble to logical resolution in terms of contributory negligence and thus by the objective inquiry of
whether the plaintiff's choice was unreasonable.
"i1f the plaintiff is to be saddled with constructive knowledge of the risk because of its obvious
or apparent nature, this is equivalent to saying that he was contributorily negligent in not in fact
discovering the danger. Cf. PROSSER § 68, at 447-49.
61d. at 442. Indeed, some courts expressly purport to limit application of assumption of risk
to situations involving a contractual relation between the parties. E.g., Walsh v. Vest Coast Mines,
31 Wash. 2d 396, 406, 197 P.2d 233, 238 (1948).
tTPROSSER § 68 n.29.
"sSee note 22 infra. Any precise and unequivocal distinction between these two defenses is
exceedingly difficult to pinpoint without a thorough analysis of the issues which each raises. It is
often said that contributory negligence is measured by the objective standard of the reasonable man
as applied to the plaintiff's behavior, while assumption of risk is properly confined to the subjective
knowledge and appreciation of the risk which the plaintiff encounters. PROSSER § 68. at 441. That
this distinction is not satisfactory for all purposes is evidenced by the fact that contributory
negligence may be used in two senses, one employing an objective and the other an ostensibly
subjective standards: the defect is apparent, but the plaintiff negligently fails to notice it; and the
plaintiff is fully aware of a patently obvious and unreasonable risk yet proceeds to encounter it. It
should be noted; however, that even the latter situation does not present a pure application or the
subjective standard. Although the plaintiff concededly has actual knowledge of the danger. his
conduct in choosing to -meet it is nevertheless compared with that of the ordinary reasonable man
under like circumstances. This overlapping of contributory negligence and assumption of risk has
caused some confusion in the courts. Id.
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assumption of risk as a separate doctrine is quite dispensable 9 and that
the issues traditionally disposed of by that defense are much less confus-
ingly treated under the headings of consent,2" lack of duty, 21 and contri-
butory negligence.
22
It appears unlikely, however, that there will be a direct renunciation
of the doctrine in the near future, if only for the reason that it provides
an attractive and convenient vehicle for the denial of recovery in cases
in which a highly intricate network of competing interests would other-
wise have to be dealt with and resolved. On the other hand, a growing
number of jurisdictions have effectively approached the same result by
coming in through the back door, so to speak, in dealing with the scope
of liability in negligence cases. Instead of affirmatively restricting the
reach of assumption of risk and thereby imposing a greater procedural
burden on the defendant,23 these courts have imposed a broader scope
of duty on certain owners and occupiers of land, thereby rendering as-
sumption of risk inappropriate in situations in which it would have
traditionally been applied.
In the usual situation, the general rule is that a landowner has no
duty to render affirmative precautions, even to the extent of a warning,
"against dangers which are known to the [invitee], or so obvious to him
"See authorities cited note 3 supra.
"0In the field of intentional torts the plaintiff's consent to the tortious invasion has
long been recognized as a defense. Consent has not been an established rubric in the law
of negligence, but there is no reason why it cannot exist here too. Consent to what? In
both intentional torts and negligence the consent is to the defendant's conduct. In the
intentional tort this involves consent to the actual invasion of the plantiff's interest in
person or property. In negligence it involves only his agreement to being subjected to a
danger of possible invasion. In other words the plaintiff "assumes the risk."
Wade, supra note 3, at 7.
21The "defendant's duty and the plaintiff's assumption of risk are not correlative and it is
misleading to define one in terms of the other." Id. at II.
2North Carolina evidently recognizes no separate doctrine of assumption of risk in the absence
of an express contractual agreement between the parties, and issues raised both by that defense and
contributory negligence are lumped together and treated in terms of the latter. E.g., Jernigan v.
Atlantic Coastline R.R., 275 N.C. 277,-167 S.E.2d 269 (1969); Broadaway v. King-Hunter, Inc.,
236 N.C. 673, 73 S.E.2d 86l (1953); Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N.C. 377, 64 S.E.2d 276 (1951).
2lt should be emphasized that assumption of risk is a defense which must in all instances be
pleaded and proved by the defendant in order to defeat the plaintiff's recovery. PROSSER § 68, at
455. On the other hand, while most courts likewise treat contributory negligence as a defense, there
are a few jurisdictions which impose the burden on the plaintiff to plead and prove his freedom
from contributory negligence as well as the defendant's negligence in order to state a cause of action.
This was the position adopted, for example, in Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 A. 433 (1930),
despite a vigorous dissent by-Chief Justice Wheeler.
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that he may be expected to discover them.1 24 Assumption of risk, then,
would normally be a perfectly legitimate defense here in the absence of
qualifying circumstances. There has been a recent tendency, however, to
roll back this general "no-duty" rule with respect to certain classes of
landowners on the basis of the anticipatory nature of the harm despite
the obviousness of the risk or the plaintiffs knowledge thereof.
There appears to be no difficulty in making an exception to the rule
with respect to public utilities and government agencies.25 The reason
generally given for treating these concerns more strictly than other land-
owners is that the former hold out their services and facilities to mem-
bers of the public, who are entitled to make use of them and who may
reasonably expect and demand to be able to use them in reasonable
safety." Neither knowledge nor obviousness of the risk should be a
defense here, for the obligations of the public 'utility and government
agency are such that they may not be relieved from responsibility by
forcing members of the visiting public to choose between carefully meet-
ing an unreasonable risk which acts as an obstacle to attainment of the
proffered right and foregoing that right altogether. It follows that under
these circumstances the public utility or government agency should rea-
sonably foresee that such members would choose to encounter known
or obvious dangers that they would not otherwise encounter, solely be-
cause of their reluctance to give up the public right to which they are
entitled.
Similar considerations prevail in the employer-employee relation-
ship, although liability here is couched in terms of abandonment of
assumption of risk rather than an extension of duty. It has already been
intimated that several jurisdictions have by decision or statute expressly
"4RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS _§ 343A(1), Comment e (1965). See cases cited
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Appendix § 343A, Comment e at 233-34 (1966).
2See, e.g., Dierks v. Alaska Air Transport, 109 F. Supp. 695 (D. Alas. 1953); Williamson v.
Derry Elec. Co., 89 N.H. 216, 196 A. 265 (1938); Toroian v. Parkview Amusement Co., 331 Mo.
700, 56 S.W.2d 134 (1932).
21See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(l), Comment a (1965).
2'North Carolina adopted this position many years ago. E.g., Sibbert v. Scotland Cotton Mills,
145 N.C. 308, 59 S.E. 79 (1907); Marks v. Harriet Cotton Mills, 135 N.C. 287, 47 S.E. 432 (1904).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has occasionally paid lip service to assumption of risk in
extending liability to employers, but as often as not it has brought in contributory negligence as
well without attempting to distinguish the two and without acknowledging that they may be
anything but identical. See note 22 supra.
430 [Vol. 50
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
eliminated assumption of risk from this area, for reasons such as those
persuasively stated in Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital:
28
The policy reasons which gave rise to the doctrine of assumption of risk
in the master-servant area . . . no longer suffice to support the harsh
effects upon injured employees who seek redress for their employer's
negligence. Public opinion, reflected in workmen's compensation legis-
lation. has dictated a change in the underlying concepts of employers'
responsibility. In almost all areas of industrial activity, social insur-
ance has replaced the common law rules of liability and defenses which
grew out of the judicial inclination to foster a growing economy. No
longer can it be said that a judicially-imposed doctrine of assumption
of risk is necessary or desirable to protect expanding industry from
being crippled by employers' responsibility for tortious conduct toward
their employees.
29
The rule which has emerged from this metamorphosis of public
sentiment is that an employee never assumes risks arising from the
employer's negligence but does assume those which remain after due
care has been exercised by the employer-in other words, those risks
which are inherent in the work and which are contractually borne by the
employee.30 This qualification prevents the employer from being treated
as an insurer of his employees' safety, yet leaves the employer liable for
his own culpable acts and omissions. This in turn relieves the employees
of having to choose between meeting unreasonable risks and forgoing
their means of livelihood altogether.
Any tendency toward expanding the duty owed by landowners other
than public utilities, government agencies, and employers has under-
standably been much more sluggish. This is probably a reflection of the
general reluctance of the judiciary to break new ground in an area
strongly rooted in tradition 3 1 but it by no means indicates that such
inroads have not in fact been made. The next such extension of duty
would logically seem to attach to the commercial landowner who invites
2 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1967); see, e.g., cases cited therein.
22d. at 318, 373 P.2d at 773.
3"See, e.g., Goodwin v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 335 Mo. 398,406,72 S.W.2d 988, 991 (1934).
3'Concepts of property and ownership of land have held a lofty position among English-
speaking peoples since feudal times, and it is thus understandable that immediate suspicion and
hostility should attach to any attempts of the judiciary to undercut the absolute dominion of the
property owner over his land. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1432 (1956). This accounts
in large part for the glacial extension of liability into this general area and the resulting inhibition
which has persisted to the present day.
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members of the public onto his premises in order to have a pecuniary
benefit conferred upon him and who in doing so has impliedly estab-
lished the reasonable safety of these premises. This progressive step, in
fact, has recently been taken in several jurisdictions, motivated in large
part by the theory that a commercial landowner who has held out defec-
tive premises for the public's use should not be heard to complain on
grounds of assumption of risk when a member of that public suffers
injuries as a result of having chosen to make use of those premises for
the very purpose for which they were tendered.
The court in Hoar lent its full support to this position by quoting
with approval section 343A(l) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
"'A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.' "3 In holding that a
commercial landowner may be held liable even to an invitee who had
knowledge of the risk which caused the injury, the court joined those
other jurisdictions which have imposed an active duty on the part of the
commercial landowner to provide reasonably safe premises for invitees,
which goes beyond the common law obligation to protect against known
or foreseeably dangerous conditions that are not known by the invitee
or apparent to him.34
But Hoar goes even further than this. Faced with the argument that
the plaintiff in that case voluntarily encountered the risk of the icy path
when she was under no compulsion to do so, the court simply rejected
the rule which bars a plaintiff from recovery because of assumption of
risk where the choice of action has been a free and voluntary one.35 The
duty of the landowner is thus not limited by the fact thatthe invitee
voluntarily and reasonably encounters the known or obvious risk, if it
could be anticipated by the landowner that harm arising from that risk
would nevertheless occur. Under the facts of the Hoar case, it therefore
appears that there is -no room for assumption of risk by any stretch of
the imagination-the voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice of action is
immaterial under the new rule, and the fact that the plaintiff had actual
2Pribble v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 249 Ore. 184, 437 P.2d 745 (1968); cf. Findley v. Lipsitz,
106 Ga. App. 24, 126 S.E.2d 299 (1962).
33327 F. Supp. at 577, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965).
3See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
31327 F. Supp. at 577-78.
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knowledge of the dangerous condition is equally meaningless in view of
the affirmative duty imposed on the defendant to make the premises safe
as against known or obvious dangers which may be anticipated to cause
harm. Liability may be denied only by a finding that the plaintiff, having
discovered the dangerous condition, proceeded to encounter it in an
unreasonable manner, which properly gives rise to an issue of contribu-
tory negligence and not assumption of risk .
3
It would appear that the court in Hoar has performed an inestima-
ble service to the legal profession in having taken a giant step toward
the elimination of much of the confusion surrounding the application of
assumption of risk by focusing instead on intelligent consideration of the
primary issue in these cases. That issue, simply enough, is whether or
not the defendant should be held liable despite the plaintiffs knowledge
of the risk he chose to encounter. In dealing with this question, it must
be decided whether or not the plaintiff's choice of action under the
circumstances was a reasonable one. Another way of putting this is by
asking whether or not a duty will be imposed on the defendant to the
extent that the plaintiffs choice will be deemed as a matter of law to
have been a reasonable one. Sidetracking on the issue of voluntariness
by asking whether the advantages gained by the plaintiff's having met
the risk negligently created by the defendant outweighed the disadvan-
tages thereof serves only to obscure the determinative question. Perhaps
cognizant of this, some courts seem to have gone out of their way in
finding a lack of voluntariness on the part of the plaintiff's action in
order to permit recovery.3 7 Consideration of this question should not be
necessary at all if in fact it can be determined that the duty of the
defendant shall be extended to protect the plaintiff under the attendant
circumstances, as it was so determined in Hoar.
3
It is important to bear in mind, however, that while the duty im-
posed in Hoar affected a commercial landowner under the limiting facts
of that case, it is by no means certain that the court would further extend
this duty to ordinary landowners should the question arise in the future.
Neither can it safely be said that the court's rejection of the voluntari-
ness test under the facts in Hoar necessarily eliminates that requirement
16See notes 18, 22 supra.
'See, e.g., Peterson v. W. T. Raleigh Co., 274 Minn. 475, 144 N.W.2d 555 (1966).
31"[A]ny general doctrine denying recovery to one who voluntarily elects to take a chance is
an unwarranted limitation on the landowner's duty." Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Land-
owner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108, 120 (1961) (emphasis by the author).
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as to all situations in which assumption of risk may present itself.31 Still,
it undoubtedly appears that this case goes beyond the limitations in this
general area imposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and in this
regard it is in keeping with the recent tendency to extend liability to
commercial owners and occupiers of land by virtue of broadening con-
cepts of duty.40
Comment a to section 343A(l) of the Restatement states that that
subsection "includes in particular the patrons of a public utility who
enter land in its possession seeking its services, to which as members of
the public they are entitled," 41 and it also applies to invitees of a govern-
ment or of a government agency. Commercial landowners are not men-
tioned at all in this context, let alone ordinary owners and occupiers of
land, and it thus seems that the Restatement has taken an overly cau-
tious stand on the extension of duty owed to invitees, a stand which has
rightly been disapproved in Hoar. This case, then, strikes a balance
between the Restatement position and the logical end result of the recent
liberal expansion with respect to landowners-a sweeping imposition of
duty without regard to the specific label which might properly be at-
tached to a given landowner.42 Other jurisdictions have gone further than
Hoar in the direction of imposing the same standard of duty on all
landowners regardless of classification 43 but none has taken the bold
step of holding that the voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice of action
may not be held to negate the effects of the duty so imposed. It is at
39See note 14 supra.
'0 For excellent discussions of the problems involved in this general area, see Keeton, Personal
Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629 (1952); Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 20 TEx. L. REV. 562 (1942).
41RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(l), Comment a (1965). "In determining whether
the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is
entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance
indicating that the harm should be anticipated." Id. § 343A(2).
4'Professor James would seem to adhere to the latter position in all instances save those in
which there is an express agreement to assume the risk. See James, supra note 2, at 187-88.
'ORowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), is the landmark
case which has broken all precedent in abolishing the arbitrary common law classification of
plaintiffs as trespassers, licensees, and invitees usually applied in determining the duty owed by a
defendant landowner to the plaintiff. The thrust of the decision is to impose on landowners a single
duty of reasonable care in all situations regardless of the plaintiff's status. The plaintiff's particular
status is still one factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct, but under Rowland it is no longer solely determinative of the standard by which that
conduct is measured. Accord, Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d
445 (1969); cf. Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955).
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present uncertain where the line may ultimately be drawn with respect
to those classes of landowners affected by the rejection of the voluntari-
ness test, if indeed one is drawn at all. Nevertheless, Hoar's innovative
approach may well prove to be the legal catalyst long needed in this area
to remove some of the injustices which result when assumption of risk
is mechanically applied to situations in which it is not warranted and in
which the plaintiff cannot conscionably be allowed to go uncompen-
sated.44 If so, the change can only be a beneficial one.
Without specifically so holding, the court in Hoar arguably may
have done away with assumption of risk in Vermont in all landowner
cases by expressly eliminating one of the two primary elements of the
defense. The other element-actual or implied knowledge of the
risk-has been severely emasculated as well by the aforementioned ex-
tension and expansion of duty with respect at least to commercial owners
and occupiers of land. Whether or not other jurisdictions will follow the
Vermont example in rejecting the voluntariness test in cases raising the
issue of assumption of risk remains to be seen, but it is submitted that
this is a refreshing approach to the modification of an outdated legal
doctrine which has done more harm than good through the years by
often denying without just cause the deserved redress of innocent plain-
tiffs' invaded interests.
PHILIP D. LAMBETH
"Cf Osborne v. Imperial Irrig. Dist., 8 Cal. App. 2d 622,47 P.2d 798 (1935).
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